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The proposed Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) has led to fierce debate over how best 
to ensure employees a choice on the question of unionization.  The debate goes to the 
core of our federal system of labor law.  Each of the potential legislative designs under 
consideration — including both “card check” and “rapid elections” — aims to enhance 
employee choice by minimizing or eliminating managerial involvement in the 
unionization process.  The central question raised by EFCA, therefore, is whether 
enabling employees to limit or avoid managerial intervention in union campaigns is an 
appropriate goal for federal law.  This Article answers this foundational question in the 
affirmative.  It reaches this conclusion by conceptualizing federal labor law in terms of 
legal default rules, drawing in particular on the preference-eliciting default theory of 
statutory interpretation and the reversible default theory from corporate law.  Doing so 
leads to the argument that card check, rapid elections, and similar mechanisms are best 
understood as “asymmetry-correcting altering rules” — means of mitigating the 
impediments that block departure from the nonunion default.  Understanding EFCA in 
this way also requires that we ask how such an altering rule should be constructed.  This 
Article addresses this institutional design question by arguing that card check’s open 
decisionmaking process is flawed and that rapid elections, while an improvement over 
the status quo, are an insufficient method of mitigating the relevant impediments to 
employee choice.  Accordingly, this Article offers two new designs — alternatives to both 
card check and rapid elections — that would accomplish the legitimate function   
of minimizing managerial intervention while at the same time preserving secrecy in 
decisionmaking. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federal labor law aims to ensure that employees have a choice on 
the question of unionization.  But enabling this choice has proven an 
elusive goal.  Indeed, designing a legal regime that protects employees’ 
ability to choose whether they wish to bargain individually or collec-
tively with their employers has been a central and continuing chal-
lenge for scholars, Congress, and the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  *  Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  For helpful comments and suggestions, 
the author thanks Rachel Brewster, Glenn Cohen, Einer Elhauge, Cynthia Estlund, Gerald Frug, 
Heather Gerken, Jack Goldsmith, James Greiner, Gillian Lester, Daryl Levinson, Adriaan Lanni, 
Yair Listokin, John Manning, Martha Minow, Gerald Neuman, Benjamin Roin, Lisa Sachs, Vicki 
Schultz, Jed Shugerman, Adrian Vermeule, and participants in the Harvard Law School Faculty 
Workshop, the Harvard Law School Junior Faculty Workshop, the NYU Annual Conference on 
Labor, and the Yale Law School Workplace Theory and Policy Workshop.  Jaime Eagan, David 
Seligman, and Summer Smith provided excellent research assistance.    
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The question of employee choice has gained heightened attention in 
the opening months of the Obama Administration.  The interest cen-
ters around the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), a bill that would 
change the process through which workers organize unions.  As cur-
rently drafted, EFCA would enable employees to form unions through 
a procedure known as “card check.”  Under card check, if a majority 
of workers in a relevant unit sign authorization cards solicited in an 
open process by union organizers and other employees, the employer 
would be legally obligated to recognize the union as the employees’ 
collective representative.1  
EFCA’s card check provision captured the public’s attention, be-
came the subject of intensive media coverage, and led to heated con-
gressional debate.  Card check also generated intense opposition, based 
primarily on the procedure’s failure to provide employees with a con-
fidential means to register their choices on the question of unioniza-
tion.  Echoing arguments made historically to support secret balloting 
in political elections, critics of the legislation have asserted that an 
open decisional mechanism like card check impedes autonomous em-
ployee choice because it leaves employees unduly vulnerable to coer-
cive solicitation by union organizers.2  Now, following months of scru-
tiny, Senate negotiators are entertaining possible alternatives to card 
check.  The lead proposal is a “rapid elections” regime, which, as I de-
scribe below, would maintain the secret ballot but mandate that union 
elections take place almost immediately after the completion of a union 
organizing drive.3 
Whether EFCA becomes law in its current form, is amended to 
substitute rapid elections for card check, or fails to pass, the debate 
over the legislation allows for reexamination of questions central to la-
bor law.  As I will explain, card check and rapid elections share the 
same substantive goal: they aim to minimize or eliminate managerial 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  1  See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).  EFCA was passed 
by the House of Representatives in 2007 but died in the Senate after a cloture vote failed 51–48.  
See Govtrack.us, H.R. 800:  The Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-800 (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). 
  2  See infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
  3  See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill To Assist Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 16, 2009, at A1.  I discuss rapid elections in section V.B.1, concluding that while such 
a regime would constitute an improvement over the status quo, more robust reform is both possi-
ble and desirable.  According to the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), in addition to rapid elec-
tions, Senate negotiators are also considering substituting a “mail-in card[]” procedure for card 
check.  Derrick Cain, Negotiations Continue on EFCA Bill Despite Report on Compromise Deal, 
[2009] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 136, at A-18 (July 20, 2009).  I develop the mail-in procedure 
below, see infra section V.B.3, pp. 723–27, a proposal offered in Benjamin Sachs, Card Check 2.0: 
A Better Fix for Union Organizing than the Employee Free Choice Act, SLATE, Apr. 16, 2009, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2216272.     
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intervention in union organizing efforts.4  A rapid elections regime at-
tempts to achieve this goal in a straightforward way: by requiring that 
workers vote on unionization almost immediately after an organizing 
drive has ended, rapid elections limit the amount of time management 
has to campaign against unionization.  Card check attempts to achieve 
this same goal by jettisoning the election entirely and allowing em-
ployees to demand union recognition as soon as a majority have signed 
cards.  Card check, that is to say, is designed to allow workers to com-
plete a unionization effort before management is aware that such an 
effort is underway. 
Accordingly, the central substantive question raised by the EFCA 
debate — by each of the designs under consideration — is whether it 
is appropriate for federal law to enable employees and unions to mi-
nimize, or avoid entirely, managerial intervention in organizing efforts.  
This issue is foundational for labor law.5  It is a question that long 
predates the Employee Free Choice Act and one that will long outlive 
the current debate, irrespective of its outcome. 
The question could be answered in a predictable and relatively 
easy way if labor law had a normative preference for unionization.  
But because labor law neither favors nor disfavors unionization, in-
stead allowing employees to decide which form of bargaining they pre-
fer, the appropriateness of curtailing managerial intervention in union 
organizing efforts must be investigated as part of an overall analysis of 
employee choice.  To this end, I propose to address this question in a 
new way by drawing on the preference-eliciting default theory of statu-
tory interpretation and the reversible default theory from corporate 
law, two closely related theories of legal default rules.6  Although these 
theories grow out of very different contexts, both help determine how 
legislatures (or courts) should choose default rules for a legal regime 
designed to maximize the satisfaction of some relevant preference set.  
Both theories, moreover, share a key insight: because of asymmetric 
impediments of one kind or another, it is often more difficult for par-
ties to “depart” from one default rule than it would be for them to de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  4 As discussed in section V.B.3, the mail-in procedure also under consideration in the Senate 
shares this same goal. 
  5  A seminal treatment is found in Paul Weiler, Promises To Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to 
Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) [hereinafter Weiler, Promises 
To Keep].  For additional discussion, see PAUL  C.  WEILER, GOVERNING  THE  WORKPLACE 
257–61 (1990); Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Coopera-
tion: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 793–801 (1994); and 
Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor 
Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 507–15 (1993). 
  6  See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 151–67 (2008) (preference-eliciting 
default theory); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corpo-
rate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) (reversible default theory); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf 
Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489 (2002) (same).    
2010]  EMPLOYEE CHOICE  659 
part from another.  Both theories then suggest the same answer: when 
the legislature (or court) does not know with certainty which default 
rule will maximize satisfaction of the relevant preference set, and when 
it is more difficult to depart from one default than it would be from 
the other, the legislature (or court) should choose the default from 
which it is easier to depart.7  That way, if the initial placement of the 
rule turns out to be wrong, the parties will be best positioned to exer-
cise their preferences and correct the misplacement. 
In contexts defined by asymmetric impediments to departure, then, 
changing the default rule is one means to maximize satisfaction of pre-
ferences.  It is not, however, the only means.  In certain contexts, the 
same preference-maximizing goals that can be achieved by adopting a 
reversible or preference-eliciting default can also be secured by chang-
ing the process through which parties depart from the default.  More 
specifically, by changing the process through which parties depart 
from a default in a manner that mitigates the asymmetry that called 
for the reversible default in the first place, legislatures (or courts) can 
maximize the preferences that are the aim of the legal regime.8  Profes-
sor Ian Ayres has named the processes through which parties depart 
from defaults “altering rules.”9  I  w i l l  n a m e  a  r u l e  t h a t  c o r r e c t s  a n  
asymmetric ability to depart from the default an “asymmetry-
correcting altering rule.” 
Card check and rapid elections are best understood as asymmetry-
correcting altering rules.  The good to be maximized by the rules go-
verning employee decisionmaking on the union question is employee 
choice.10  As in the corporate law and statutory interpretation contexts, 
moreover, labor law must choose a default rule: workplaces must ei-
ther be union or nonunion by default.11  Preference-eliciting and re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  7  See ELHAUGE, supra note 6, at 153–55; Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 492–93. 
  8  As I elaborate below, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani point to the operation 
of such a rule in the corporate context.  See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 505–06; see 
also infra section III.A.2, pp. 677–79. 
  9  Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 6 (2006).  Ayres has identified the role 
played by altering rules — and has named them — but has not yet provided a comprehensive 
treatment of the subject.  See id. at 3 n.2.   
  10  This statement is not a claim that the only good sought by the entire regime of labor law is 
free employee choice, but only a claim that choice is the good sought by those labor law rules that 
govern employee decisionmaking on the union question.  See, e.g., NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 
U.S. 324, 330 (1946) (noting that Congress has required the Board to establish rules and “safe-
guards necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees”); 
see also Arlen Specter & Eric S. Nguyen, Policy Essay: Representation Without Intimidation: Se-
curing Workers’ Right To Choose Under the National Labor Relations Act, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
311, 312 (2008) (“The most critical focus of [labor law] reform should be protecting the right of 
employees to freely choose whether they wish to be represented.”). 
  11  See Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work,  87 V A.  L.  REV.  205,  208 
(2001) (“In the workplace, as elsewhere, the law cannot ‘do nothing.’ . . . [I]t is necessary to start 
somewhere — not with nature or voluntary arrangements but with an initial allocation of legal 
    
660  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 123:655  
versible default theory suggest a way to approach this decision.  First, 
when it comes to maximizing employee preferences on the union ques-
tion, we must be — by definition — entirely uncertain whether em-
ployees prefer the union or nonunion option.12  Second, because of col-
lective action problems and managerial opposition to unionization, 
which I describe below, employees have an asymmetric ability to de-
part depending on where the default is set.  It is at least somewhat 
more difficult for employees to depart from the nonunion default and 
choose unionization than it would be for employees to depart from a 
union default and choose nonunion bargaining. 
In this setting, then, we have two options to maximize employee 
choice.  First, labor law could impose a new default rule of union bar-
gaining.  Second, we could change the altering rule — the process 
through which employees depart from the nonunion default — in a 
way that mitigates the asymmetric ease of departure.  Because the re-
levant asymmetry here flows from management’s opposition to unioni-
zation and its ability to intervene in the employee organizing process, 
an altering rule — like card check or rapid elections — that minimizes 
management’s ability to intervene can correct the relevant asymmetry.  
This Article accordingly provides conceptual support for both a 
new default rule of unionized collective bargaining and a new altering 
rule that minimizes managerial intervention in organizing.  In the ab-
stract, there is no reason to prefer one approach over the other,13 but 
because there are highly significant pragmatic, political, and institu-
tional reasons to favor a new altering rule, that is the approach this 
Article pursues.  It should be noted that either approach is appropriate 
not because of any normative preference for unionization or a belief 
that more employees desire unionization than want nonunion bargain-
ing.14  To the contrary, either approach is appropriate precisely be-
cause we assume complete uncertainty about what employees desire, 
and we seek to enable them to choose either union or nonunion bar-
gaining with equal ease. 
The default and altering rule analysis is thus meant to point us to-
ward a revised labor law that removes certain impediments to the eli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
rights.”); see also WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 5, at 228 (noting that 
individual employment contracting is often understood to be the natural default rule); Barenberg, 
supra note 5, at 959–61.  
  12  See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (setting out employees’ right to form and join labor unions and 
an equal “right to refrain from any or all of such activities”). 
  13  Although, as I explain below, because of workforce turnover, a union default would not be 
sufficient unless paired with an asymmetry-correcting altering rule.  As such, our choice is not 
between adopting a union default or an asymmetry-correcting altering rule, but between adopting 
a union default and an asymmetry-correcting altering rule or adopting just the new altering rule.  
See infra pp. 693–95. 
  14  See ELHAUGE, supra note 6, at 163; infra p. 693.    
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citation of workers’ preferences and that eliminates several forms of 
interference with employee preference formation.  These goals, to be 
sure, constitute a more limited project than creating ideal conditions 
for fully autonomous and deliberative choice among workers.15  That 
project would call into question more than the rules of union organiz-
ing and employee decisionmaking I take up here.  Such a project also 
would necessitate a reexamination not only of the first principles of la-
bor law, but likely also the organization of the firm itself.16  Addition-
ally, it would require agreement on the deeply contested issue of what 
constitutes fully autonomous (or free) choice.  The present analysis 
concerns itself with a range of issues that, while narrower than those 
implicated by such a project, is nonetheless central to advancing em-
ployee choice on the question of unionization. 
An approach to maximizing employee choice that depends on mi-
nimizing managerial participation in union organizing campaigns, of 
course, raises two related questions.  The first is whether labor law 
ought to provide employers with an affirmative right to intervene in 
the employee organizing process.  As I will show, the argument in fa-
vor of an affirmative right for employer intervention depends on a 
flawed conception of what unionization entails.  Unionization, for bet-
ter or worse, does not effect a shift in sovereignty over the firm.  It is a 
far more limited process, one in which employees decide to bargain 
collectively, rather than individually, with their employers and to name 
their agent for these purposes.17  And while the outcome of the em-
ployees’ decisionmaking process will impact employers, this fact does 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  15  For an example of a project that is closer to these ambitions, see Barenberg, supra note 5. 
  16  As I note below, see infra note 152, deliberative democratic theorists agree that an ideal de-
liberative process requires both formal and substantive equality among the participants in the 
debate.  See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLI-
TY 17, 22 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989).  Organizing rules — such as those I propose 
— might insulate employees from employer interventions during organizing efforts, see infra note 
152, but they could never entirely eliminate managerial influence over employee preference for-
mation.  Given the explicit inequalities inherent in the employer-employee relationship, unless 
that relationship is itself reconstructed, organizing rules and labor law more broadly simply may 
not be capable of creating ideal deliberative or choice processes.   
  17  The move from individual to collective bargaining describes the change in the relationship 
between employees and employers effected by unionization.  Unionization can also create new 
possibilities for community among workers, modify employees’ perceptions of themselves in im-
portant ways, and — particularly in immigrant communities — alleviate conditions of intense 
social isolation.  See, e.g., HÉCTOR L. DELGADO, NEW IMMIGRANTS, OLD UNIONS 20–58, 138 
(1993); RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY 121–79 (1988); William V. Flores, Mujeres 
en Huelga: Cultural Citizenship and Gender Empowerment in a Cannery Strike,  in L ATINO 
CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 210, 210–54 (William V. Flores & Rina Benmayor eds., 1997).  But the 
ways in which unions can reconstitute employee-to-employee relationships and alter workers’ self-
perceptions cannot provide a justification for employer intervention in the union organizing 
process, so I do not consider those dynamics here.    
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not entitle employers to an affirmative right to intervene in that 
process. 
The second question returns us to the focus on employee choice and 
concerns the loss of information available to employees in an organiz-
ing effort conducted with a minimum of managerial involvement.  A 
decrease in the quantity of information available to employees — in-
formation concerning the demerits of unionization — is a cost of 
adopting an asymmetry-correcting altering rule that minimizes em-
ployer intervention.  But, as I will show, the cost to employee choice is 
likely to be marginal and will not outweigh the benefits to choice that 
flow from the new altering rule.  This is so for several reasons, includ-
ing the fact that neither card check nor rapid elections would deprive 
management of its ability to mount an argument against unionization, 
but would change only the time frame in which it is likely to do so. 
The question of managerial intervention in union organizing efforts 
is the core conceptual issue raised by the debate over EFCA.  But that 
debate also raises an institutional design question worthy of attention.  
Namely, if minimizing managerial intervention through an asymmetry-
correcting altering rule is a legitimate goal for labor law, the question 
of how best to design such an altering rule remains.  The debate over 
card check also poses the particular question of whether an open deci-
sional mechanism is necessary to the purpose of minimizing manageri-
al intervention and, more broadly, whether an open decisional mechan-
ism is an appropriate means to achieve that goal. 
This Article contends not only that an open decisional mechanism 
is unrelated to the substantive goal of minimizing employer interven-
tion in unionization campaigns, but also that openness has no legiti-
mate asymmetry-correcting function.  Openness, however, can expose 
employees to forms of union and coworker interference at the moment 
of decision that should be of concern.  While claims of physical intimi-
dation by union organizers do not find support in extant empirical evi-
dence,18 the potential for intimidation inherent in an open voting pro-
cedure — and the significant public concern over this potential — 
raises legitimacy issues for unions organized through such processes.  
Moreover, if voting is open, organizers and coworkers will often enjoy 
other, nonphysical but effective forms of influence: especially in low-
wage industries, union organizers may possess an advantage in learn-
ing and rhetorical skills that can give them the kind of “epistemologi-
cal authority” that Professor Lynn Sanders describes.19  And the co-
workers who are sent to solicit cards are often selected because of their 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  18  See sources cited infra note 46. 
  19  Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 349 (1997) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).    
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location within the organization of work, which may provide them 
with very real sources of authority vis-à-vis the workers they solicit — 
so long as the vote is an open one. 
This Article asks, therefore, how we can best construct a decisional 
mechanism that minimizes managerial intervention in employee orga-
nizing efforts while at the same time preserving secrecy in decision-
making.  To be sure, rapid elections offer employees a confidential de-
cisional mechanism, and according to the analysis offered here, they 
constitute an improvement over the status quo.  But, for reasons de-
veloped below, rapid elections are not the best approach to minimizing 
managerial intervention in union organizing efforts.  Among other 
problems, the success of a rapid elections regime would depend on he-
roic performance by the NLRB, a federal agency that over the last 
several decades has proved itself to be anything but “rapid.”20  
Because neither card check nor rapid elections are the optimal 
course, this Article proposes two alternatives that I call “card check 
2.0.”  The first proposal, borrowing voting technologies used in union 
elections in the airline and railroad industries, would enable employees 
to cast secret ballots in their homes over the phone or via the internet.  
The second, drawing on the model of early voting now used in U.S. 
political elections, would allow employees to vote by secret ballot at 
regulated polling sites, or through mail ballot voting, at any time dur-
ing an organizing drive.  In short, both designs preserve the secret bal-
lot, and both explicitly disable union organizers and union supporters 
from soliciting or handling ballots or even being present when em-
ployees register their choice on the union question.  But both preserve 
the asymmetry-correcting function of enabling employees to minimize 
or eliminate employer intervention in union organizing drives. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides, by way of back-
ground, a stylized description of the union organizing process under 
traditional National Labor Relations Act21 (NLRA) rules, under a rap-
id elections regime, and under card check.  Part III explains the prefe-
rence-eliciting and reversible default theories and applies these theories 
to the union organizing context.  It then suggests card check and rapid 
elections as asymmetry-correcting altering rules.  This Part also dis-
cusses the inadequacies of traditional enforcement as an approach to 
employee choice.  Part IV addresses the questions of management’s af-
firmative right to intervene in the employee organizing process and 
employees’ interest in receiving information from employers about un-
ionization.  Part V evaluates arguments for openness in voting, as-
sesses the prospects for a rapid elections regime, and then proposes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  20  See discussion infra section V.B.1, pp. 718–19. 
  21  29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).    
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two alternatives to card check and rapid elections that accomplish the 
organizing-technological goal of enabling employees to minimize em-
ployer intervention in employee organizing drives while preserving 
secrecy in employee decisionmaking.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  UNION ORGANIZING UNDER THREE LEGAL REGIMES 
In this Part, I offer a highly stylized model of union organizing un-
der current NLRA rules and then provide a model of organizing under 
two alternative regimes: rapid elections and card check.22 
A.  The Current NLRA Procedure 
Under federal labor and employment law, individual employment 
contracting is the default rule in U.S. workplaces — bargaining over 
terms and conditions of work in the default position takes place be-
tween individual employees and their employers.23  The NLRA gives 
employees the right to depart from this default by forming labor un-
ions and bargaining collectively with their employers over terms and 
conditions of employment.24  Under traditional NLRA procedures, the 
process of departing from the default rule involves two discrete phases: 
the organizing phase and the decisional phase. 
During the organizing phase, union organizers along with sympa-
thetic employees attempt to build support for the union among the 
workforce.  Although some discussions between employees take place 
at work, the effort consists primarily of visits with employees when 
they are not at work through so-called “house calls.”25  Through these 
discussions, organizers and pro-union employees field questions from 
employees about the process of forming a union and about the likely 
results if unionization should succeed, and they relate the merits of un-
ionization.  Ultimately, organizers urge employees to commit to voting 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  22  These simplified accounts are sufficient for present purposes.  For two recent and superb 
descriptions of the fuller process, see  STEVEN  HENRY LOPEZ, REORGANIZING  THE  RUST-
BELT (2004); and RUTH MILKMAN, L.A. STORY: IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE FUTURE 
OF THE U.S. LABOR MOVEMENT (2006).  For a description of less traditional organizing tactics, 
see Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich, It Takes More Than House Calls: Organizing To Win 
with a Comprehensive Union-Building Strategy, in ORGANIZING TO WIN 19, 19–36 (Kate Bron-
fenbrenner et al. eds., 1998). 
  23  See, e.g., WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 5, at 228. 
  24  See 29 U.S.C. § 157.  If a majority of employees in a relevant bargaining unit decide they 
want collective bargaining, the law requires the employer to bargain in good faith with the union 
that the employees select as their representative.  See id. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a). 
  25  The prevalence of and need for offsite contacts is largely a product of NLRA rules.  Under 
current law, employers are entitled to prohibit discussions of unionization during work time and 
in working areas.  See, e.g., Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), cited in Republic 
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945).  Moreover, union organizers have no right 
to access employees on company property.  See Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).    
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in favor of unionization and to signing authorization cards, which are 
later used to request that the NLRB conduct a union representation 
election.26 
Because of the intensity of employer opposition to unionization, a 
subject I take up below, unions try to complete as much of the organiz-
ing phase as possible before the employer becomes aware of the effort.  
Thus, union organizing guides instruct organizers on maintaining as 
low a profile as possible for as long as possible.  For example, in the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Or-
ganizing Model & Manual, the first three stages of an organizing cam-
paign are described in a chapter titled “Keeping the Campaign Pri-
vate.”27  The Teamsters’ organizing guide is similarly clear about the 
importance of conducting organizing without employer knowledge, in-
structing organizers that at all early stages of the campaign “the orga-
nizer’s work is totally underground.”28 
Under current NLRA rules, although a union can avoid managerial 
intervention for a time, the union is required to give management no-
tice of the organizing campaign well before the vote on unionization 
takes place.  An employer is only obligated to recognize a union as its 
employees’ collective representative if and when a majority of em-
ployees vote for union representation in a secret ballot election con-
ducted by the NLRB.29  In order to secure such an election, employees 
must “petition” the Board by submitting authorization cards signed by 
at least 30% of the employees in the relevant bargaining unit,30 and 
once this petition is filed, the Board notifies the employer of the orga-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  26  See 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
  27  AM. FED’N  OF STATE, COUNTY & MUN. EMPLOYEES, ORGANIZING MODEL & MA-
NUAL 1-6 (1999) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  The first step involves assessing 
employees’ interest in unionization.  The manual explains, “While assessing worker interest, don’t 
tip off the employer.  This is ‘undercover’ work.”  Id.  The second phase involves making initial 
contacts with potential leaders, and here the manual instructs organizers “to recruit potential 
leaders as quietly and as quickly as we can.”  Id. at 1-9.  And then in the third stage of the cam-
paign, which involves building an “organizing committee” of employees, the manual directs that 
“[t]he organizer needs to constantly stress the need for secrecy and to make assessments discreet-
ly.”  Id. at 1-11. 
  28  INT’L  BHD.  OF  TEAMSTERS, ORGANIZING  GUIDE  9 (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library). 
  29  See, e.g., Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).  While a union 
is entitled to demand recognition from the employer once the union has authorization cards signed 
by a majority of the employees in a relevant bargaining unit, the employer is under no obligation 
to recognize a union based on cards — even if they are signed by 100% of the unit employees — 
and is entitled to respond to the union’s demand with a simple “no comment.”  See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594 (1969).  See generally James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agree-
ments and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 I OWA  L.  REV. 819 
(2005).  This was not always the case, and in earlier years the Board would order recognition, or 
mandate bargaining, based on other signs of majority support.  See, e.g., Becker, supra note 5, at 
507–15.   
  30  See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (2009).    
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nizing effort.  On average, an NLRB election is scheduled forty-one 
days after the employees’ petition is filed, meaning that the campaign 
is public for approximately six weeks prior to the time employees 
vote.31 
Once the organizing campaign becomes public, employers — in 
nearly all cases — mount a campaign of their own designed to discou-
rage employees from choosing unionization.32  As has been docu-
mented both in the scholarly literature and in congressional hearings 
on the matter, employers have at their disposal a variety of mechan-
isms, both legal and illegal, for discouraging unionization, and they use 
these tools with some frequency.33  For example, firms often schedule 
one-on-one meetings between employees and their supervisors along 
with mandatory meetings of the entire workforce, during work time, to 
convey their view that unionization is not in the interests of the em-
ployees or the firm.34  Employees may be disciplined or discharged if 
they refuse to attend these meetings.35  Quite often, though prohibited 
by federal law, employers threaten that unionization will result in job 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  31  John-Paul Ferguson reports: “The average case that went to election did so in 41 days, and 
95% of elections were held within 75 days of filing.  The tail, however, is quite long; the maxi-
mum delay before election recorded in the data is 1,705 days.”  John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of 
the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Organizing Drives, 1999–2004, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 3, 10 n.9 (2008).   
  32  In her study of 1004 NLRB certification elections, Kate Bronfenbrenner found that employ-
ers mounted some form of anti-union effort in 96% of the campaigns.  Kate Bronfenbrenner, No 
Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing 10 tbl.3 (Econ. Policy 
Inst., EPI Briefing Paper No. 235, 2009) [hereinafter Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred], available 
at http://epi.3cdn.net/edc3b3dc172dd1094f_0ym6ii96d.pdf.  As Professor Paul Weiler writes, “[i]t is 
the time lag between the filing of a representation petition and the vote . . . that gives the employ-
er the opportunity to attempt to turn its workers against the union.”  Weiler, Promises To Keep, 
supra note 5, at 1777.  Employees who oppose the union will also attempt to persuade coworkers 
that unionization is a mistake and that remaining in the default position of individual bargaining 
is the optimal choice.  In some cases, employees form a “vote no” committee.  These committees 
are frequently supported by the employer, although such support is illegal.  See, e.g., Kate L. 
Bronfenbrenner,  Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-Contract Campaigns: 
Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
75, 79 tbl.5.1 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994); James Rundle, Winning Hearts and Minds in 
the Era of Employee Involvement Programs, in ORGANIZING TO WIN, supra note 22, at 213, 219 
tbl.13.1. 
  33  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 110-23, at 8 (2007); KATE BRONFENBRENNER, UNEASY TER-
RAIN: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MOBILITY ON WORKERS, WAGES, AND UNION ORGANIZ-
ING ( 2000),  available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002& 
context=reports; Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1527, 1537 & n.42 (2002); Weiler, Promises To Keep, supra note 5, at 1769–86. 
  34  According to several empirical studies of employer anti-union tactics, between 75% and 
98% of employers schedule one-on-one meetings with employees to discourage unionization, while 
80–90% of companies require employees to attend a mass meeting.  See GORDON LAFER, AM. 
RIGHTS AT WORK, NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR: THE SUBVERSION OF DEMOCRACY UNDER 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ELECTIONS app. at 42 tbl.2 (2007). 
  35  See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030–31 (1968); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 
N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948).    
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loss and in the closing of the firm.36  Finally, in many organizing cam-
paigns, employers discharge union supporters as a means of nipping an 
organizing campaign “in the bud.”37 
Under current rules, when the organizing phase is complete, em-
ployees are called on to the make their choice about unionization 
through a secret ballot election.  On a day designated by the Board, 
employees are directed to a location on the employer’s property where 
they cast their ballots.  If more than 50% of voting employees vote in 
favor of unionization, the employer is required by law to recognize the 
union as the employees’ bargaining agent.  If fewer than 50% vote in 
favor of unionization, the firm continues with the default arrangement 
of individual employment contracting.38 
B.  Rapid Elections 
A rapid elections regime would leave nearly all of the current rules 
for union organizing and recognition in place, and thus union cam-
paigns under such a regime would proceed largely in the manner de-
scribed immediately above.  Unions, as they do now, would attempt to 
keep their organizational activity underground for as long as possible.  
As under current law, in order to unionize under a rapid elections re-
gime, employees would be required to petition the Board for an elec-
tion once they gathered cards signed by 30% of the relevant bargaining 
unit.39  When employees filed the petition, the Board would notify the 
employer of the campaign.  Employees would vote, as they do now, in 
a secret ballot election conducted on the employer’s property. 
Unlike the current regime, however, a rapid elections regime would 
call on the NLRB to hold representation elections within a strictly li-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  36  See, e.g., Shearer’s Foods, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 1093, 1094 (2003); see also BRONFENBREN-
NER, supra note 33, at v, 18; Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred, supra note 32, at 10 tbl.3. 
  37  Lloyd’s Ornamental & Steel Fabricators, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 367, 367 (1972).  As I note be-
low, the data on the specific level and rate of discharges are contested.  See infra note 113.  For 
example, Professors John Schmitt and Ben Zipperer report that one in five union activists is dis-
charged, Professor Charles Morris puts the number at approximately one in eighteen, and a report 
by the Center for Union Facts arrives at one in thirty-seven.  See J OHN  SCHMITT  &  
BEN ZIPPERER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, DROPPING THE AX: ILLEGAL FIR-
INGS  DURING  UNION  ELECTION  CAMPAIGNS  1  (2007),  available at http://www.cepr.net/ 
documents/publications/unions_2007_01.pdf; J. JUSTIN WILSON, CTR. FOR UNION FACTS, UN-
ION MATH, UNION MYTHS 7 (2008), available at http://www.unionfacts.com/downloads/union_ 
math_union_myths.pdf; Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Ac-
tivity Under the NLRA and RLA, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 317, 330 (1998).  For reasons ex-
plained in section II.B.1, below, our concern will be less with the precise frequency of discharge 
and more with the general phenomenon.  See infra pp. 684–85. 
  38  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (2006).  
  39  In some proposals, the move to rapid elections entails a concomitant increase in the percen-
tage of employee support necessary for a petition.  Weiler, for example, suggests requiring 55% or 
60% employee support for a rapid-election petition.  See  WEILER, GOVERNING  THE 
WORKPLACE, supra note 5, at 255.    
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mited period of time following the filing of the petition.  Proposals 
range from five days to two weeks.40  As such, rapid elections aim to 
reduce dramatically the period of time during which a union campaign 
must be public and thus to minimize the amount of time that employ-
ers have to intervene in organizing efforts.  As Professor Paul Weiler 
describes it, in a rapid elections regime: 
The Board would . . . conduct an immediate election in five days or so 
[following the petition]  .  .  .  .  [B]ecause the vote would be conducted so 
close to the time the union surfaced from its organizational drive, the die 
would largely be cast as far as the employer was concerned.  There would 
be no extended campaign during which management could try either to 
persuade or to pressure its employees to change their minds.41 
Two points bear mention.  First, although rapid elections aim to 
limit the window of opportunity for managerial intervention in union 
campaigns, the proposal would still statutorily guarantee employers 
some minimum window of time — again, five days to two weeks — 
during which they could oppose unionization.  Second, rapid elections 
would restrict managerial intervention to this statutory minimum only 
if employees succeed in keeping their campaigns “private” until the 
moment the petition is filed.  Should management learn of union orga-
nizational activity prior to the filing of a petition, its interventions 
could begin at that point. 
C.  Card Check 
Card check would offer employees a substantially different process 
for organizing unions.  Under a card check regime, employees would 
register their choice on the question of unionization by signing a card 
indicating that they want a union to serve as their agent for purposes 
of collective bargaining with the employer.42  Unlike an NLRB elec-
tion, in a card check regime there is emphatically no requirement of 
secrecy.  To the contrary, cards may be solicited by a union supporter 
and signed in the presence of the union supporter who solicited the 
card.  Moreover, although the validity of a card can be challenged ex 
post on the ground that it was obtained through coercion or fraud, 
there is no contemporaneous oversight of the card solicitation process.  
Under a card check regime, if a majority of employees in the relevant 
bargaining unit sign authorization cards, the employer is then required 
to recognize the union as the employees’ agent and to bargain collec-
tively with the union.  If fewer than 50% of employees in the unit sign 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  40  See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 3. 
  41 W EILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 5, at 255–56. 
  42  See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).    
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cards, the firm remains in the default position of individual employ-
ment contracting.43 
For our purposes, the most salient difference between these two de-
cisional mechanisms — between card check and an NLRB election — 
is secrecy.44  The openness of card check as a decisional mechanism 
has generated enormous criticism.  Critics assert that card check im-
pedes autonomous employee choice because an open decisional me-
chanism exposes employees to coercive pressure from the coworkers 
and union organizers who solicit cards.45  Professor Charles Craver, for 
example, writes that a card check process opens “the possibility that 
employees may have signed authorization cards due to social pressure, 
misunderstanding, or outright coercion.”46 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  43  See id. 
  44  Separate objections are discussed later in this Article.  See discussion infra Part IV, pp. 701–
12.  
  45  See, e.g., DANIEL  V.  YAGER,  TIMOTHY  J.  BARTL  &  JOSEPH  J.  LOBUE, EMPLOYEE 
FREE CHOICE: IT’S NOT IN THE CARDS 4, 18, 62 (1998); see also infra section V.A, pp. 713–18.  
These arguments against a public decisionmaking process and in favor of secret voting mirror a 
central historical argument in favor of the secret ballot in political elections.  Perhaps ironically — 
given the current political posture of the debate — the development of the secret ballot election in 
the United States, and earlier in Australia, is understood as a story about protecting poor and 
working-class voters against the coercive influence of their employers and political parties.  In the 
early and mid-nineteenth century, voters in U.S. elections voted in public.  But with the expansion 
of the franchise, and particularly the enfranchisement of poor and working-class citizens, open 
voting created the possibility for vote-buying and outright coercion.  As Professors Bruce Acker-
man and James Fishkin write: 
Public balloting might be tolerable in a political world which imposed restrictive proper-
ty requirements.  .  .  .  But as the franchise widened, public voting took on a different   
appearance.  It began to look like a trick by which the rich might retain effective elec-
toral power while formally conceding the right to vote to the unwashed.  If the poor  
could vote only in public, they could not afford to deviate from the political opinions  
of  their  economic  masters. . . . James  Mill . . . had  already  made  the  point:  without  a  
secret ballot, ordinary people would only “go through the formalities, the mummery of  
voting . . . .” 
BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 38 (2004) (quoting James Mill, 
The Ballot, WESTMINSTER REV., July 1830, at 1, reprinted in JAMES MILL, POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS 227, 227 (Terence Ball ed., 1992)); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING 
WITH DOLLARS 18 (2002) (noting connection between secret ballots and the effort to eliminate 
vote-buying by political parties).  But see Pamela S. Karlan, Elections and Change Under Voting 
with Dollars, 91 C AL. L. REV. 705, 708–09 (2003) (describing the movement to secret ballots as 
part of an attempt “to exclude illiterate and foreign-born immigrants in the North, and blacks in 
the South,” id. at 708).  In a different context, concerns about executive branch retaliation can 
motivate legislative adoption of secret procedures.  See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law 
of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 416 (2004).  
  46  Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of Modest 
Proposals To Reform Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1616, 1641 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM B. 
GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND 
THE LAW (1993)).  Summarizing the critics, Professor William Gould writes that “[t]he objection 
to the use of authorization cards lies in the fact that the signing of the card may result from peer 
pressure or may not reflect the employee’s intent.”  GOULD, supra, at 162.  Outside the legal 
academy, critics of card check have been nearly uniform in attacking the possibilities for coercive 
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Proponents of the legislation argue that card check advances auto-
nomous employee choice; they do not, however, trumpet card check’s 
attributes as a decisional mechanism.  They do not, for example, de-
fend openness in decisionmaking,47 nor do they critique the secret bal-
lot as an unfair means for employee voting.  Rather, supporters argue 
that card check enhances employee choice because it corrects what 
they see as flaws in the union organizing process that precedes the 
casting of ballots.48  Namely, in their support of card check, propo-
nents point to management’s ability to intervene in the employee or-
ganizing process and through various means to interfere coercively 
with employee decisionmaking on the question of unionization. 
The framing of the card check debate, though, raises a puzzle.  If 
card check is a different way for employees to register their choice on 
the question of unionization — if it is simply a different decisional me-
chanism — how can it affect the ways in which management does or 
does not intervene in the union organizing process?  The answer to 
this puzzle lies in the observation that card check is more than a deci-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
influence that flow from the openness of the decisional process.  See, e.g., Glenn M. Taubman, 
“Neutrality Agreements” and the Destruction of Employees’ Section 7 Rights, ENGAGE, May 
2005, at 101, 103 (“[T]he process of soliciting union authorization cards relies upon coercion and 
misrepresentations . . . .”); News Release, Nat’l Right To Work Legal Def. Found., Federal Labor 
Board To Reconsider Validity of Union Organizing Through Controversial “Card Check” Method 
(June  8,  2004),  available at http://www.nrtw.org/b/nr_318.php (arguing that under card check, 
“union operatives bully workers face-to-face to sign union authorization cards that count as a 
‘vote’ in favor of unionization”); U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Challenging the Unions’ Anti-
Growth Agenda, http://www.uschamber.com/unions.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (stating that 
card check “would expose workers to union intimidation” (emphasis omitted)).  EFCA proponents, 
on the other hand, point to the rarity of reported incidents of union coercion during card-
gathering conducted under voluntary card check agreements.  See, e.g.,  The Employee Free 
Choice Act: Restoring Economic Opportunity for Working Families: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 110th Cong. 12–17 (2007) (testimony of Cynthia L. 
Estlund, Catherine A. Rein Professor of Law, New York University School of Law) [hereinafter 
Estlund Testimony],  available at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_03_27_a/2007_03_27_a. 
html; Brudney, supra note 29, at 862; Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, No More Stacked Deck: 
Evaluating the Case Against Card-Check Union Recognition, PERSP. ON WORK, Summer 2003, at 
19, 20; Gordon Lafer, What’s More Democratic than a Secret Ballot? The Case for Majority Sign-
Up, 11 WORKINGUSA 71, 80–81 (2008).   
  47  Professor Gordon Lafer is one exception.  See infra note 242 (discussing Lafer, supra note 
46, at 80–81). 
  48  For example, the AFL-CIO tells readers of its webpage that card check responds to the fact 
that “employers routinely harass, intimidate, coerce and even fire workers struggling to gain a 
union.”  AFL-CIO, Employee Free Choice Act: The System for Forming Unions Is Broken, 
http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/voiceatwork/efca/brokensystem.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).  
American Rights at Work, a leading supporter of the legislation, argues that card check is “better 
at ensuring employee free choice by allowing employees to express their true wishes free from em-
ployer coercion,” and that card check procedures “avoid the anti-democratic and inherently coer-
cive anti-union campaigns that are typical of the NLRB election process.”  Am. Rights at Work, 
Majority Sign-Up Q&A, http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/employee-free-choice-act/resource-
library/majority-sign-up-qa.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).      
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sional mechanism.  In fact, and more importantly, card check is what I 
will call an organizing technology: it is a device that enables employees 
to conduct union organizing campaigns without giving notice to man-
agement that a campaign is underway and thus to limit, or avoid en-
tirely, managerial intervention. 
Card check functions in this way because, under a card check re-
gime, unions have no affirmative obligation to disclose the existence of 
the organizing drive to the employer until the union has successfully 
gathered cards from a majority of employees.  Once a majority of em-
ployees have signed union authorization cards, however, the organizing 
drive is complete and the employer is obligated to recognize and bar-
gain with the union.49  The window for employer intervention has, ac-
cordingly, closed.  To be sure, card check’s organizing technology can-
not always accomplish this objective perfectly.  Even under card 
check, no union can ensure that in every campaign management will 
not learn of its organizing efforts: most obviously, an employee op-
posed to unionization can inform management of the organizing drive 
as soon as she is visited by a union organizer.  But these imperfections 
do not alter the underlying logic and purpose of the technology. 
Although many proponents of card check legislation do not make 
the point explicitly, the fact that card check functions as an organizing 
technology of this sort is made clear by academic observers.  Professor 
Mark Barenberg, for example, describes card check as a “samizdat” 
approach to labor law reform.50  According to Barenberg: 
[Card check is designed] to preempt the employer’s use of its machinery of 
communication and incentives by allowing workers to organize unions se-
cretly through whatever underground or external communication network 
they currently can muster. . . . The employer would therefore have no op-
portunity to interfere with the workers’ collective organizing — unless it 
got wind of the underground card solicitations.51   
Professor Richard Epstein characterizes the organizing phase under 
card check as “clandestine,”52 while Weiler describes the Canadian 
card check regime by explaining that “[t]he employer is afforded no 
opportunity to campaign against the union,” because “when the union 
surfaces with a majority of the bargaining unit signed up, the statutory 
condition for certification is satisfied.”53 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  49  See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009). 
  50  Barenberg, supra note 5, at 936 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  51  Id. 
  52  Richard A. Epstein, The Employee Free Choice Act Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
19, 2008, at A15. 
  53  Weiler, Promises To Keep, supra note 5, at 1806; see also Estlund Testimony, supra note 46.  
Professor Craig Becker provides a further, historical account of card check’s organizing-
technological function.  During the brief period when the Board certified unions based on a card 
majority, Becker explains that card check “shielded [employees’] self-organization from their em-
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In sum, both rapid elections and card check aim to restructure the 
union organizing process in order to minimize or eliminate employer 
intervention in that process.  The question posed by these regimes, 
therefore, is whether this goal is an appropriate one for federal law.  It 
is to this question, one of the central issues for labor law, that I turn 
now. 
III.  LABOR LAW’S ALTERING RULE 
A.  Default and Altering Rules 
Federal labor law neither mandates nor prohibits unionization.   
Rather, it establishes the default position of individual, nonunion em-
ployment contracting, a nondefault alternative of collective bargaining 
through unions, and an “altering rule.”54  An altering rule, as Ayres de-
fines it, specifies the “means of opting” for a nondefault alternative; it 
“tell[s] private parties the necessary and sufficient conditions” for mov-
ing from the default position to the nondefault alternative.55  Labor 
law’s current altering rule — the means through which workers opt 
out of nonunion bargaining and opt into unionized collective bargain-
ing — is the NLRB secret ballot election process. 
Neither card check nor a rapid elections regime would change la-
bor law’s default rule; the default position would still be individual, 
nonunion employment contracting.  Nor would card check or rapid 
elections change the statutory alternative to the default rule; collective 
bargaining through unions over terms and conditions of employment 
would remain the nondefault alternative.  Both alternatives would, 
however, change labor law’s altering rule in order to minimize man-
agement’s ability to intervene in the unionization process.  Under rap-
id elections, employees would vote on the union question almost im-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ployer . . . [because] [m]embership cards could be solicited without employers knowing that their 
employees were organizing.”  Becker, supra note 5, at 535.  Professor James Brudney, explaining 
the reduced levels of opposition to unionization campaigns under voluntary card check agree-
ments, writes that “[t]he diminished levels of employer opposition presumably relate to unions’ 
ability to . . . reach large numbers of workers before employers can begin to generate pressure 
against the organizing effort.”  Brudney, supra note 29, at 826.  In the context of a voluntary card 
check agreement, reduced employer opposition may in fact be attributable to a selection effect; 
namely, those employers who voluntarily agree to card check recognition may for various reasons 
be less inclined to oppose unionization.  The relevance of Brudney’s observation here is merely 
that card check does in fact enable unions to conduct organizing efforts with a minimum of em-
ployer intervention.   
  54  Ayres, supra note 9, at 6.  As several authors have noted, there is nothing inevitable or natu-
ral about the choice of a nonunion default rule.  Paul Weiler, for example, explains that the rule 
has “its roots in the common law background of the NLRA: the tacit legal assumption that the 
‘natural’ status for a workplace is nonunion.”  WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra 
note 5, at 228; see also Barenberg, supra note 5, at 933–34; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 256.   
  55  Ayres, supra note 9, at 6.    
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mediately following the completion of their organizing efforts.  Card 
check would effect a more pronounced change: under card check, em-
ployees could move from the nonunion default to the union alternative 
by signing authorization cards. 
Card check and rapid elections, moreover and more to the point, 
are not simply modified altering rules; they are easier altering rules 
than those provided by current law.  By allowing employees to com-
plete organizing campaigns with a minimum of managerial interven-
tion and opposition, card check and rapid elections make it significant-
ly easier than it is under current law for employees to opt out of the 
nonunion default and choose unionization. 
To assess whether such a liberalization of labor law’s altering rule 
is appropriate, I turn to two theories of legal default rules: the prefe-
rence-eliciting default theory in statutory interpretation56 and the re-
versible default theory in corporate law.57  Both theories are concerned 
with maximizing the satisfaction of some relevant set of preferences, 
and their conclusions are remarkably similar.  As I will show, accord-
ing to both the preference-eliciting and reversible default approaches, 
where there is uncertainty regarding how to maximize the good sought 
by a rule (for example, enactable preferences in statutory interpretation 
and shareholder value or preference in corporate law58) and there is an 
asymmetric ability to depart from one default or another, we should 
choose the default from which it is easiest to depart. 
Changing the default is one way to maximize preferences where 
asymmetric impediments to departure exist.  But, as I will argue and 
as reversible default theory suggests, the same preference maximiza-
tion that can be achieved by changing the default can also be secured 
by adopting an altering rule that eliminates the asymmetric impedi-
ment to departure.  That is, by adopting an “asymmetry-correcting al-
tering rule” we can achieve the same preference-maximizing aims of a 
reversible or preference-eliciting default. 
1.  Preference-Eliciting Default Theory. — In his recent work on 
statutory interpretation, Professor Einer Elhauge argues that, under 
conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric power, courts should inter-
pret unclear legislation by using “preference-eliciting default rules.”59  
These default rules are most likely to maximize “political satisfaction” 
because they are most likely to result — at the end of the day — in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  56  See ELHAUGE, supra note 6, at 151–67. 
  57  See Bebchuk, supra note 6; Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6. 
  58  It is possible, for purposes of this discussion, to remain agnostic as to whether shareholder 
preferences are equivalent to shareholder (or firm) value.  As noted below, our concern here is 
with how these default theories maximize the good sought by the legal regime and not with what 
good the legal regime seeks to maximize.  See infra notes 60, 74. 
  59  ELHAUGE, supra note 6, at 152.    
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statutory language that most fully captures the “enactable preferences” 
of the polity.60  Although preference-eliciting defaults are designed to 
maximize enactable preferences, these default rules do not call on 
courts to choose the statutory interpretation they believe is most likely 
to capture those preferences.61  Rather, a preference-eliciting default 
requires courts to choose the interpretation “more likely to be corrected 
by the legislature because it burdens some politically powerful group 
with ready access to the legislative agenda.”62  That is, a preference-
eliciting default requires courts to choose the interpretation that would 
be disfavored by the party to the interpretive debate with the greatest 
capacity to force the legislature to correct an erroneous interpretation. 
Elhauge provides the following illustration.  Suppose, he writes, 
that a court can interpret a statute in two different but plausible ways: 
interpretation A or interpretation B.  There is a 60% chance that in-
terpretation  A captures enactable preferences, and there is a 40% 
chance that interpretation B gets it right.  Now suppose, Elhauge con-
tinues, that if interpretation A does not capture enactable preferences, 
there is a 0% chance that the legislature will correct the court’s inter-
pretation — a 100% chance that the incorrect interpretation will stick.  
Conversely, if interpretation B is incorrect, there is a 100% chance that 
the legislature will react by correcting the court’s interpretation — a 
0% chance that the wrong choice will stick.63 
In this example, should the court choose interpretation A, it can ex-
pect that overall “expected political satisfaction” will be 60%: in the 
40% of the cases where the court’s interpretation does not capture 
enactable preferences, the legislature will do nothing to correct the 
court’s inaccurate interpretation.  However, should the court go with 
interpretation B, expected political satisfaction will be 100%.  This is 
so because the court will choose the right interpretation 40% of the 
time, but in the 60% of the cases in which the court chooses the wrong 
interpretation, the legislature will correct the court and replace the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  60  See id.  Elhauge’s argument for preference-eliciting defaults depends on a conclusion that 
enactable preferences are the “good” that statutory interpretation should maximize.  Although El-
hauge mounts a defense of this conclusion, see id. at 23–38, it is a contestable one.  But it is un-
necessary to take a position on this debate here.  What Elhauge’s theory of preference-eliciting 
defaults shows us — and, as I will explain below, what reversible defaults theory shows us as well 
— is how to design a default rule (in conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric power) in order to 
maximize a good once we have determined what that good is.  The how question can be pursued 
independently of the what question, and that is what I intend to do here. 
  61  For a seminal discussion of nonmajoritarian defaults in contract law, see Ian Ayres & Ro-
bert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
  62  ELHAUGE supra note 6, at 152.  The legislative “correction” can be ex ante in the form of 
more precise drafting to avoid the potential for future judicial misinterpretation, or it can be ex 
post in the form of a legislative override of the judicial misinterpretation.  See id. 
  63  Id. at 153.    
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court’s interpretation with a new statute that better captures enact-
able preferences.  As such, “[c]hoosing preference-eliciting option B 
will . . . ultimately increase the expected satisfaction of enactable pre-
ferences, even though option B itself is less likely to reflect enactable 
preferences than A.”64 
Elhauge shows that preference-eliciting default rules are appropri-
ate when certain conditions are met: first, there must be uncertainty 
regarding enactable preferences; and second, there must be an asym-
metry in the likelihood that the legislature will correct the judicial in-
terpretation depending on which interpretation the court chooses.65  In 
fact, the appropriateness of employing a preference-eliciting default 
depends primarily on an interaction between these conditions.  Where 
there is complete certainty about the legislature’s preferences, there is 
no justification for a preference-eliciting default.  In these cases, a 
court knows what the legislature prefers, and it should interpret the 
statute accordingly.66  Where there is uncertainty about legislative pre-
ference, however, a preference-eliciting default rule is appropriate if 
there is sufficient asymmetry between the likelihood that the legisla-
ture will correct one option or another.  Most useful for our purposes, 
Elhauge shows that when a court is completely uncertain about what 
interpretation the legislature would prefer — if, following the illustra-
tion above, the court believes there is a 50% chance that the legislature 
would choose interpretation A and a 50% chance that the legislature 
would choose B — then a preference-eliciting rule is appropriate if 
there is any  asymmetry in the likelihood of correction.  As Elhauge 
writes: 
[W]here a court is completely uncertain about whether a legislature would 
prefer option A or B, a preference-eliciting default rule makes sense as 
long as the legislature is to any extent more likely to correct B than A.  
Even if the odds that B will stick uncorrected are 99%, and the odds that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  64  Id. 
  65  Id. at 155–65.  Elhauge adds a third condition: the interim costs of choosing the wrong rule 
must be tolerable.  This condition underscores the fact that the preference-eliciting rule will often 
result in a judicial interpretation of a statute that is less likely to capture enactable preferences in 
the short run, in order to elicit a legislative reaction that will better capture enactable preferences 
in the long run.  Although some legislative correction will come ex ante in the form of more pre-
cise legislative drafting intended to avert the prospect that a court will apply a preference-eliciting 
rule, much will be ex post in the form of legislative override of judicial opinion.  In these cases, 
between the moment of judicial interpretation and the moment of legislative correction, we are 
forced to live with a rule that fails to capture enactable preferences.  There are costs associated 
with this fact.  See id. at 165.  In our context, in which we assume complete uncertainty as to em-
ployee preference, either default rule is equally likely to be wrong, and each rule will have costs 
associated with it that will be difficult to measure.  Given the statutory commitment to ensuring a 
choice on the union question, the costs of either default probably must be deemed “acceptable.”  
In any event, as discussed below, I do not suggest that we change labor law’s default rule, and so 
we need not engage in this cost calculus. 
  66  Id. at 155.    
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A will stick uncorrected are 100%, option B should be chosen when the 
court has no reason to think the legislature might prefer option A over 
B.67 
In the context of statutory interpretation, asymmetry in the likeli-
hood of legislative correction flows from differentials in the political 
power of groups on either side of the interpretive dispute.68  These 
power differentials might be explained, as Elhauge shows, because one 
side has a better ability to shape the legislative agenda, to intervene in 
drafting, to raise issues with the legislature, or to block legislative 
change.69  But “[w]hatever the cause, preference-eliciting analysis pro-
vides a reason for favoring” the party with less political power in the 
interpretive dispute.70  This conclusion is, in some respects, deeply 
counterintuitive.  After all, if courts were to choose a default rule 
geared toward most accurately estimating enactable preferences, they 
would do far better by choosing the interpretation favored by the most 
politically powerful side of the debate.  But again, Elhauge shows that 
by choosing the interpretation favored by the politically weaker side  
of the interpretive debate, the court can invite legislative correction  
in the event that it chooses wrongly, and thereby maximize political  
satisfaction.71 
Finally, Elhauge stresses that the reason it is appropriate for courts 
to choose a default rule that favors the politically weaker party in an 
interpretive debate is definitively not because those with less political 
power are more likely to support benevolent policies, nor because po-
litically weak groups deserve any kind of special solicitude, nor be-
cause the politically weak are likely to reflect enactable preferences of 
the polity as a whole.72  It is not because the politically weak are likely 
to be “right” in any sense.  T o the contrary, the point of favoring the 
politically weak is that doing so “will produce a precise legislative ap-
praisal of the weight the political process wishes to give those inter-
ests.”73  That is, the point of favoring the politically weak is that doing 
so will more likely result in an outcome that maximizes enactable pre-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  67  Id. at 162.  Elhauge demonstrates this theory formally, see id. at 161–62, but it is sufficient 
here simply to observe the following: if there is a 50% chance that both interpretation A and in-
terpretation B capture legislative preferences, and there is a 0% chance that the legislature will 
correct A but a 1% chance that it will correct B, then the court can assume that the expected po-
litical satisfaction of choosing A is 50% while that of choosing B is 50.5%.  In order to maximize 
enactable preferences, the court should choose B — the preference-eliciting default — even 
though both interpretations are just as likely to capture enactable preferences. 
  68  See id. at 162–63. 
  69  See id. 
  70  Id. at 163. 
  71  See id. 
  72  See id. 
  73  Id.    
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ferences, even though enactable preferences may well ultimately prove 
to be contrary to the policies the politically weak would have chosen. 
2.  Reversible Default Theory. — For Elhauge and statutory inter-
pretation, the question is how to design a default rule that maximizes 
enactable preferences when there is uncertainty regarding those prefe-
rences and the distribution of political power between the parties to 
the interpretive dispute produces an asymmetric ability to depart from 
the default.  Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani take up a 
similar question in the context of corporate law and come to a similar 
conclusion.74  As Bebchuk and Hamdani explain, outside of those rela-
tively few areas of corporate governance that are regulated by manda-
tory rules (for example, insider trading), corporations enjoy the free-
dom to establish rules of governance by contract, generally by 
including such rules in the corporate charter.75  But corporate charters 
are “inevitably incomplete,” and to address these gaps corporate law 
provides default rules that remain in force until the corporation 
amends its charter.76  The challenge for corporate law is to select de-
fault rules that are most likely to maximize shareholder value or 
shareholder preferences.77 
The traditional approach to default rules in corporate law is the 
“hypothetical bargains” approach.78  Here, where there is uncertainty 
regarding which of two rules would maximize value, the court or the 
legislature is to choose the rule that it believes “fully informed and ra-
tional shareholders would have most likely chosen had they considered 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  74  See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6; see also Bebchuk, supra note 6.  In developing a 
theory of default rules for this context, Bebchuk and Hamdani make two normative assumptions, 
both of which are worth noting here but, again, neither of which is important for our purposes.  
First, the authors assume that the good to be maximized by the law of corporate governance is 
shareholder value.  See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 491 n.6.  This is a contestable — 
though fairly widely held — view.  But again, our concern here is not what good corporate law 
seeks to maximize, but rather how a default regime can maximize that good.  Second, the authors 
assume that “market players and investors in any given company are more likely than public offi-
cials to identify the superior [that is, value-maximizing] arrangement for their company.”  Id. at 
497.  This assumption is necessary to justify the choice of some default rule rather than a manda-
tory one; where the public officials “know better” than market actors what the right outcome is, 
mandatory rules are appropriate.  Id.  Again, this assumption — though widely held — is also 
contestable, but we need not engage with this debate either.  Our question is not whether a de-
fault arrangement is appropriate in the labor law context, but which default arrangement best  
maximizes employee choice.  We can therefore accept both assumptions for the purposes of this  
discussion.  
  75  See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 496. 
  76  Id. 
  77  This assertion accepts, for these purposes, the assumptions noted above.  See supra note 74.  
Again, we can remain agnostic regarding whether shareholders will always have a preference for 
maximizing value. 
  78  Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing David 
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1815 (1991)).    
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this question.”79  Bebchuk and Hamdani, however, reject the hypothet-
ical bargains approach to corporate defaults because, as they explain, 
this approach “overlooks a fundamental asymmetry in the process of 
opting-out of default rules.”80  The asymmetry of concern to Bebchuk 
and Hamdani flows from management’s control over the process by 
which corporate charter amendments are initiated.  Although a corpo-
rate charter can be amended by a vote of the corporation’s sharehold-
ers, such a vote “take[s] place only on amendments initiated by   
management.”81  Thus, this managerial “veto power over charter 
amendments” creates an asymmetry between those arrangements that 
management favors and those it disfavors.82 
In particular, should a legislature or court choose a default rule that 
turns out to decrease shareholder value, and management disfavors the 
rule, shareholders will be able to depart from the default rule because 
management will likely initiate a charter amendment.  In contrast, 
should the legislature or court choose a value-decreasing default rule 
that management favors, it is less likely that shareholders will be able 
to depart from the default because it is less likely that management 
will initiate the amendment process.  Because “there are impediments 
to reversing a default arrangement favored by managers[,] . . . such an 
arrangement . . . might not be reversed even if the arrangement is val-
ue decreasing.”83 
According to Bebchuk and Hamdani, this asymmetry between the 
reversibility of defaults favored and disfavored by management sug-
gests that the hypothetical bargains approach will often fail to maxim-
ize shareholder value.  To correct this failing, the authors suggest the 
“reversible defaults” approach.84  Under the reversible defaults rule: 
[W]henever there is uncertainty over the identity of the value-maximizing 
arrangement, a preference should generally be given to the alternative that 
is more restrictive of managers.  This restrictive alternative would be re-
versed if it turns out to be value decreasing [and left in place if not],   
whereas the alternative favored by managers would remain in place if 
chosen as default even if it turned out to be value decreasing.85 
So far, the theory of reversible defaults points to the same conclu-
sion as the theory of preference-eliciting defaults.  According to both 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  79  Id. 
  80  Id. at 492. 
  81  Id. 
  82  Id.  There is a “differen[tial] in the prospects of reversal by corporations between those de-
fault rules that management favors — because they restrict managers less than their alternative 
— and those alternative, more restrictive rules.”  Id. 
  83  Id. at 503.  In relatively rare circumstances, shareholders can successfully pressure man-
agement to propose charter amendments that do not favor management.  See id. at 502–03. 
  84  Id. at 503. 
  85  Id.    
2010]  EMPLOYEE CHOICE  679 
approaches, the combination of uncertainty regarding the relevant pre-
ference set and an asymmetric ability to depart from the default calls 
for choosing the default from which it is easiest to depart.  But Beb-
chuk and Hamdani provide an additional insight that is important 
here.  Namely, the authors explain that although a charter amendment 
is required to opt out of most corporate default arrangements, in some 
instances the default can be reversed by amending the corporate by-
laws.  And unlike a charter amendment, bylaws can be amended by 
shareholders without board approval — that is to say, without a need 
for management to initiate the amendment process.86  Accordingly , in 
instances where default reversal can be accomplished through bylaw 
amendment, management no longer enjoys an asymmetric ability to 
block a departure from the default rule.  As Bebchuk and Hamdani 
put it, “[w]ith respect to such issues [governed by bylaw amend-
ment], . . . the  asymmetry  between arrangements favored and disfa-
vored by managers in terms of ease of reversibility would large- 
ly disappear.”87  And so they conclude that “[b]y allowing opting out  
via a bylaw amendment, public officials would ensure that, if the   
chosen default turned out to be value decreasing, shareholders would  
be able to reverse it easily and not be stuck with a value-decreasing  
arrangement.”88 
Although Bebchuk and Hamdani do not use the following lan-
guage, what they identify here are two different altering rules for cor-
porate law defaults — two different “means of opting” for a nondefault 
alternative.89  What their theory reveals, moreover, is that when a 
court or legislature is faced with uncertainty regarding which rule 
shareholders would prefer, and there is an asymmetric ability to depart 
depending on which rule is chosen as the default, the court or legisla-
ture can maximize value in one of two ways.  First, the court or legis-
lature can choose the reversible default, the one from which it is ea-
siest to depart.  Or second, the default can be set according to the 
traditional hypothetical bargains approach, and the altering rule can 
be changed in a manner that mitigates the asymmetric ability or power 
to depart from the default.  The key insight here is that value — or 
shareholder preference — can be maximized either by choosing the de-
fault rule from which it is easiest to depart or by adopting an asymme-
try-correcting altering rule.90 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  86  See id. at 505–06. 
  87  Id. at 505. 
  88  Id. at 506. 
  89  Ayres, supra note 9, at 6. 
  90  The two approaches may not be perfect substitutes.  For example, collective action prob-
lems can impede shareholders from pursuing bylaw amendments, even in the absence of mana-
gerial interference.  See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 6, at 506.  For Bebchuk and Hamdani, 
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B.  Default and Altering Rules To Maximize Employee Choice 
For preference-eliciting default theory, the question is how to de-
sign default rules to maximize the enactable preferences of the legisla-
ture.  For reversible default theory, the question is how to design a de-
fault regime to maximize shareholder value or preference.  In our 
context, the question is how to structure the rules governing organizing 
campaigns in a manner that maximizes the satisfaction of employee 
preferences on the union question.  What might preference-eliciting 
and reversible default theory tell us about the appropriate choice of de-
fault and altering rules in this context?  Again, a preference-eliciting or 
reversible default approach is appropriate when there is uncertainty 
regarding how to maximize the good sought by the regime and there is 
an asymmetric ability to depart from the default depending on where 
the default is set.  In our context there is uncertainty — indeed defini-
tional uncertainty — regarding actual employee preferences.  For each 
workplace and for each potential bargaining unit, we do not know, nor 
are we permitted to assume, whether employees prefer union or non-
union bargaining until they in fact express a choice on this question.  
Further, as I discuss in this section, there is an asymmetric ability to 
depart depending on where the default is set.  Because of a series of 
collective action problems and market failures that disproportionately 
affect employees who wish to move from nonunion to union gover-
nance, and because of managerial opposition to unionization, it is more 
difficult for employees to depart from a nonunion default (to choose 
unionization) than it would be for employees to depart from a union 
default (to choose nonunion, individual employment contracting). 
1.  Impediments to Unionization: Collective Action Problems and 
Direct Managerial Intervention. — Management generally opposes   
unionization.  This fact is essentially undisputed and is evident from a 
host of empirical studies.  In Professor Kate Bronfenbrenner’s sample 
of 1004 NLRB certification elections, for example, employers mounted 
some form of anti-union effort in 96% of the campaigns.91  Similarly, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the implication of these coordination problems is that — even when opting out of the default is 
possible through bylaw amendment — there should still be a presumption, though not as strong, 
in favor of setting the default rule against management.  See id. 
  91  Bronfenbrenner,  No Holds Barred,  supra note 32, at 10 tbl.3.  Although spending levels 
cannot tell us what percentage of employers oppose union drives, the aggregate levels are sugges-
tive.  Annual spending on union opposition “consultants” is estimated at approximately $200 mil-
lion, and when managerial and supervisory time is included, the estimates approach $1 billion.  
See John Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, and the ‘Union Free’ Movement in the USA Since the 
1970s,  33 I NDUS.  REL.  J.  197,  198 ( 2002);  see also J OHN  J.  LAWLER, UNIONIZATION  AND 
DEUNIONIZATION 79–117 (Hoyt N. Wheeler & Roy J. Adams eds., 1990); John Logan, The Un-
ion Avoidance Industry in the United States, 44 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 651, 656 (2006).  Although 
he disputes the accuracy of many of Bronfenbrenner’s findings, Epstein agrees that employers 
oppose unionization.  He attributes this opposition to a “brutal economic reality.”  Richard A. 
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Chirag Mehta and Professor Nik Theodore collected data on sixty-two 
union campaigns launched in the Chicago metropolitan area in 2002.  
Out of the sixty-two campaigns in the study, the employer engaged in 
some form of anti-union effort in sixty-one, or 98.4% of the time.92 
The fact of employer opposition establishes the basis for a series of 
asymmetric impediments to unionization.  The first of these impedi-
ments flows from an “intrapersonal collective action problem.”93  Here, 
rather than some individuals bearing the costs of an activity from 
which many others reap the benefits (as in a traditional collective ac-
tion setting), the problem arises because “the costs and benefits, for a 
particular person, of engaging in an activity change dramatically over 
time.”94  Because “[m]any workers greatly discount the future, some-
times treating it as irrelevant,”95 they may be prone to one particular 
form of intrapersonal collective action problem: “[A] refusal, because 
the short-term costs exceed the short-term benefits, to engage in activi-
ty having long-term benefits that dwarf long-term costs.”96  In our con-
text, for the individual employee considering whether to support a un-
ion-organizing effort, the short-term costs of supporting unionization 
almost always exceed the short-term benefits.  As we have seen (and as 
I will discuss in more detail below), workers bear a substantial risk of 
losing their jobs should they support a unionization effort,97 and 
among those union supporters who are not discharged or formally dis-
ciplined for their activity, many face softer forms of retaliation that are 
nonetheless quite significant and can diminish career prospects.98  In 
the short term, moreover, there are often no benefits from unionization; 
even when a campaign is successful, it takes many months to bargain 
a first contract and usually much longer to realize the full gains of that 
contract.99  And although the long-term benefits may well be substan-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Epstein, The Case Against the Employee Free Choice Act 25 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. 
Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 452, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1337185.  Namely, Epstein writes, employers “perceive that they have much to 
lose through unionization in the form of forgone wage increases, reduced pension and health 
plans, restrictive work rules, work stoppages, and a general loss of management prerogatives.”  
Id. at 24–25. 
  92  CHIRAG  MEHTA  &  NIK  THEODORE, AM.  RIGHTS  AT  WORK, UNDERMINING  THE 
RIGHT  TO  ORGANIZE:  EMPLOYER  BEHAVIOR  DURING  UNION  REPRESENTATION  CAM-
PAIGNS  8 ( 2005),  available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAW 
Reports/UROCUEDcompressedfullreport.pdf.   
  93  Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 26 (1991). 
  94  Id.; see also Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting 
and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 367–68 (2002). 
  95  Sunstein, supra note 11, at 206. 
  96  Sunstein, supra note 93, at 26.  Professor Cass Sunstein calls this “myopic behavior.”  Id.  
  97  See, e.g., SCHMITT & ZIPPERER, supra note 37, at 11; see also infra p. 687. 
  98  See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 5, at 933. 
  99  On average, it takes ten months for the parties to bargain a first contract.  Ferguson, supra 
note 31, at 5.  More importantly, many contracts delay or stagger the implementation of, for ex-
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tial (in the form of wage and benefit gains, for example),100 these bene-
fits are likely to be substantially discounted.101 
Accordingly, intrapersonal collective action problems can impede 
the move from a nonunion default to the union alternative.  But the 
same problems would not hinder the move in the opposite direction — 
from a union default to nonunion, individual employment contracting.  
Here, the short-term costs to employees are likely to be de minimis and 
to be outweighed by short-term benefits.  Employers likely would not 
punish employees who supported this departure from the default, and 
might indeed reward such workers either through explicit benefits or 
through softer forms of promotion. 
The intrapersonal collective action problem is similar to, and ex-
acerbated by, a dynamic that Barenberg terms an “intertemporal mar-
ket failure.”102  Here, the problem is not that workers highly discount 
the future benefits of unionization, but rather that the workers who 
bear the upfront costs of unionization are not able in fact to recapture 
those costs through downstream rewards.  So, “[e]mployees who, as un-
ion pioneers and activists, risk their careers and bear other material 
and psychic costs cannot generally capture the stream of benefits flow-
ing to workers who subsequently enter the already unionized 
workplace.”103  Again, this market failure will reduce the likelihood 
that workers will depart from the nonunion default, but its logic does 
not apply to the union default.  In that context, again, upfront costs 
are unlikely: employees who support the departure from the union de-
fault will not bear risks to their careers or other “material and psychic 
costs” but can expect, if anything, enhanced career prospects along 
with other material and psychic benefits that come from an approving 
management. 
In addition to intrapersonal collective action problems and inter-
temporal market failures, traditional collective action problems also 
make it more difficult for employees to depart from the nonunion de-
fault.  Employers have the discretion to ban much speech about unio-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ample, wage gains over the life of the contract, increasing the distance between the costs of union 
organizing and the benefits of a union contract.  See, e.g., CNA Members Ratify Four-Year Con-
tract with Two Hospitals Covering 1,450 Nurses, 23 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) No. 33, at 1290 (Aug. 
13,  2009),  available at http://news.bna.com/lrln/ ( search for “CNA 1,450 nurses”; then follow 
hyperlink to the article).  Should EFCA pass as currently drafted, the parties would have only 
four months to complete first-contract bargaining, which would reduce average bargaining time 
but would have no predictable impact on what gains are included in the first contract.   
  100  See generally John W. Budd, The Effect of Unions on Employee Benefits and Non-Wage 
Compensation: Monopoly Power, Collective Voice, and Facilitation, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 
160 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007); David Card, Thomas Lemieux & W. 
Craig Riddell, Unions and Wage Inequality, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO?, supra, at 114. 
  101  See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 206. 
  102  Barenberg, supra note 5, at 933.  
  103  Id.     
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nization on company property (since rules prohibiting employees from 
discussing unionization during working time are presumptively va-
lid)104 and can bar nonemployee union organizers from company prop-
erty entirely.105  As such, employees who wish to communicate infor-
mation in support of unionization bear the substantial transaction 
costs of identifying and then contacting all other prospective suppor-
ters during nonwork time.106  Management, on the other hand, is im-
mune from such collective action problems.  For example, managers 
have access to complete information about bargaining unit members 
and have the ability (and the legal right) to conduct one-on-one and 
company-wide captive audience meetings during working time to dis-
courage unionization.107  Management, moreover, has a “centralized 
capacity to overcome free-rider problems among individual work-
ers.”108  Although much of this conduct would constitute an unfair la-
bor practice,109 management can provide resources — including com-
municational, logistical, and financial resources — to workers who 
oppose unionization, while withholding similar resources from pro-
union employees.  For example, management often provides support to 
“vote no” committees during organizing drives.110  Finally, manage-
ment can help employees opposed to unionization overcome “second-
order” collective action problems by imposing punishment on pro-
union employees — a coordination cost that the anti-union employees 
would otherwise have to bear.111 
These collective action problems make it more difficult for em-
ployees to depart from a nonunion default than it would be for them to 
depart from a union default.  But beyond these asymmetric impedi-
ments, management can, and does, intervene directly in the employee 
decisional process in order to deter unionization.112  I will briefly dis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  104  See, e.g., Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), cited in Republic Aviation Corp. 
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945). 
  105  See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 541 (1992).  See generally Cynthia L. Es-
tlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994). 
  106  See Barenberg, supra note 5, at 934. 
  107  See, e.g., Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953) (announcing rule that such 
captive audience meetings are prohibited only if delivered within twenty-four hours of election).  
Management can also enlist supervisors “who can be peremptorily fired if they fail to implement 
the anti-union campaign to upper management’s satisfaction — [and who] afford[] a ready-made 
political machine for this purpose.”  Barenberg, supra note 5, at 934 (footnote omitted).   
  108  Barenberg, supra note 5, at 800. 
  109  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006). 
  110  In one study, Bronfenbrenner found that such support was provided in 31% of the cam-
paigns.  BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 33, at 73. 
  111  Barenberg, supra note 5, at 787.   
  112  If all employer anti-union conduct designed to influence employee decisionmaking is taken 
to be a legitimate part of how employees form their preferences, then the “stickiness” of the non-
union default caused by direct managerial opposition is attributable to legitimately altered em-
ployee preferences.  I address this question in the next section, arguing that some employer inter-
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cuss two particular forms of intervention: first, managerial threats or 
predictions that a successful unionization campaign will result in clo-
sure of the enterprise; and second, the discharge of employees in retali-
ation for support of unionization.  Both forms of intervention are pre-
valent and both have the intended effect of deterring unionization.113 
With respect to threats of closure, the Bronfenbrenner study finds 
that 57% of the 1004 employers in the sample made threats to close all 
or part of the firm if the employees decided to unionize.114  With re-
spect to discharge of workers for union activity, estimates of the fre-
quency of discharge rates vary.  Bronfenbrenner finds that employers 
discharged union activists in 34% of campaigns,115 whereas John 
Schmitt and Ben Zipperer estimate that nearly one in five workers 
who takes an active role in union organizing is discharged for doing 
so.116  Professor Charles Morris estimates that between 1992 and 1997, 
one in eighteen workers involved in organizing activity faced illegal 
retaliation.117  The lowest end of the estimate range comes from a 
study prepared by the Center for Union Facts.118  This study reports 
that in 2.7% of campaigns where the union filed an election petition, 
an employee was illegally fired for union activity.119 
Wherever the discharge rate falls in this spectrum of estimates, and 
however frequent threats and predictions of closing are, several pieces 
of evidence suggest that these forms of management opposition to un-
ionization are “extremely effective in reducing union election win 
rates.”120  Making modest assumptions about the rationality of em-
ployer spending, these findings should not be surprising.  Employers 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ventions cannot be understood as contributing to autonomous employee choice.  See infra section 
III.B.2, pp. 685–91. 
  113  The data available on the specific prevalence of these interventions are contested.  See, e.g., 
Epstein, supra note 91, at 18–41.  As noted above, however, we are concerned here not with the 
magnitude of the asymmetry created by employer opposition, but more simply with the existence 
of the asymmetry.  As such, the precision of the data presented here is of less moment than the 
general phenomena they report. 
  114  Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred, supra note 32, at 10.  In her 2000 study, Bronfenbrenner 
found that in mobile industries (including manufacturing and communication), employers threat-
ened closure in 68% of the organizing campaigns.  BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 33, at v, 20.   
  115  Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred, supra note 32, at 10. 
  116  SCHMITT & ZIPPERER, supra note 37, at 11. 
  117  Morris, supra note 37, at 330. 
  118  The Center for Union Facts is a “union watchdog” dedicated to educating the public about 
“union officials’ abuse of power.”  UnionFacts.com, About Us, http://www.unionfacts.com/ 
aboutUs.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). 
  119  WILSON, supra note 37, at 7.  The substantially lower rate reported in this last study might 
be explained by the fact that by looking only at cases where an election petition was filed, the 
study excludes all instances in which union activists were discharged and the union was never 
able to gather sufficient support to file a petition.  Nor does this study attempt to capture those 
illegal discharges of union supporters — after the filing of a petition — for which an unfair labor 
practice charge was not filed.  See id. at 5–7. 
  120  BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 33, at 43.    
2010]  EMPLOYEE CHOICE  685 
expend a great deal of resources combating union organizing drives, 
and it would be puzzling if they did so without in fact deterring unio-
nization.  Most specifically, employers frequently subject themselves to 
legal liability (in the form of back wage payments and reinstatement 
orders) in order to discourage unionization.  Although monetary dam-
ages under the NLRA are limited to compensatory relief,121 backpay 
orders are certainly not free.  In fiscal year 2007, for example, the 
Board awarded $117.3 million in backpay for “lost wages caused by 
unlawful discharge and other discriminatory action.”122 
Empirical studies on the impact of employer interventions into the 
employee organizing process support the conclusion that these inter-
ventions have their intended effect.  In her 2009 study, Bronfenbrenner 
found that employer anti-union activity was associated with declining 
union win rates.  Thus, when employers used no anti-union tactics, the 
success rate of worker organizing efforts was 72%.123  When employers 
deployed one to four of the anti-union tactics identified by Bronfen-
brenner — some of which are legal, but many of which are illegal un-
der the NLRA — the union win rate was 65%.  And when an em -
ployer used ten or more anti-union tactics, the win rate was just 
45%.124  Of particular relevance here, Bronfenbrenner finds that 
threats of plant closings and discharges of union activists (when the 
worker is not reinstated before the election) are associated with   
union win rates lower than in campaigns where these tactics are not  
deployed.125 
2.  Managerial Intervention and Employee Free Choice. — I have 
argued that two sets of factors make it at least somewhat more diffi-
cult for employees to depart from the nonunion default than it would 
be for them to depart from a union default.  The stickiness of the non-
union default is due, first, to collective action problems (and intertem-
poral market failures) that hinder employee efforts at unionization but 
would not hinder efforts to deunionize.  Second, I have argued that a 
nonunion default is stickier than a union default because employer in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  121  See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 
2695 & n.31 (2008). 
  122  72 NLRB  ANN.  REP.  10 ( 2007),  available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/ 
brochures/Annual%20Reports/Entire2007Annual.pdf. 
  123  Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred, supra note 32, at 11. 
  124  Id. 
  125  See id. at 10.  In an earlier study, Professor William Dickens found that the typical employ-
er anti-union campaign, involving both legal and illegal tactics, reduced by 5–10% the probability 
that the average employee would vote “yes” on the question of unionization.  See Weiler, Promises 
To Keep, supra note 5, at 1784.  Phil Comstock and Maier Fox, summarizing the results of more 
than 150,000 interviews with workers in nonunion firms, report that 22% of white workers and 
48% of African American workers cited “management pressure” as the primary impediment to 
union support.  Phil Comstock & Maier B. Fox, Employer Tactics and Labor Law Reform,  in 
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 32, at 90, 101.    
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tervention in the organizing process moves employee preferences in the 
nonunion direction.  Yet, if employees are more likely to choose non-
union bargaining following employer intervention because they have 
legitimately formed a preference for nonunion bargaining, then the in-
creased stickiness of the nonunion default attributable to direct mana-
gerial intervention (as opposed to that caused by asymmetric collective 
action problems) would simply be a legitimate product of altered em-
ployee preferences.  If, however, this shift in employee preferences re-
flects an illegitimate influence on preferences, then the stickiness here 
would not reflect employee free choice and would call for correction. 
In what sense might employer intervention in the union organizing 
process be inconsistent with employee free choice?  A straightforward 
way to conceive of this dynamic begins with the observation that the 
commitment to employee “free” choice reflects the idea that employees’ 
choices on the question of unionization should be autonomous.  As is 
conventionally understood, force and fraud impede the autonomy of 
choices.126  Thus, where managerial intervention involves either force 
or fraud — coercion or misinformation — the influence of such inter-
vention on employee preference expression should not be understood 
as contributing to free employee choice.127 
The discharge of union activists is a particularly stark example of 
managerial intervention that takes this form.  Here, employees who 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  126  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 
1132 (1986).  See generally 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.9, at 234–36 (4th ed. 
2004).  The relevant point here is only that force and fraud impede autonomy, not that force or 
fraud (as conventionally defined) are the only sources of such interference. 
  127  A different way to conceive of the inconsistency between certain forms of employer influ-
ence and employee choice is through the lens of “adaptive” preferences.  According to Sunstein, 
autonomous choices are those made with “a full and vivid awareness of available opportunities, 
with reference to all relevant information, and without illegitimate or excessive constraints on the 
process of preference formation.”  Sunstein, supra note 93, at 11.  Following Sunstein, then, prefe-
rences are not autonomously formed if individuals believe that some part of the universe of op-
tions, which is in fact open to them or in some normatively compelling sense should be open to 
them, is unavailable.  See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 5, at 796–97.  Preferences formed under 
these conditions can be described as “adaptive” rather than autonomous.  JON ELSTER, SOUR 
GRAPES 109–10 (1983).  Sunstein provides several examples of adaptive preference formation, 
one of which relates specifically to unionization.  He writes that: 
Workers seem not to be willing to trade much in the way of money for self-government.  
But that preference may be a product of a belief that self-government in the workplace 
is unavailable.  Were the option to be one that workers conventionally thought available, 
the option might be highly valued. 
Sunstein, supra note 126, at 1148 (footnote omitted); see also Jon Elster, Comments on Krouse and 
McPherson, 97 E THICS 146, 153 (1986) (“[R]ather than the absence of worker-controlled firms 
being explained by the absence of a desire for self-management, the causal chain may be the other 
way around.”).  Indeed, much employer intervention into the union organizing process — includ-
ing in particular the discharge of union activists and threats of plant closure described below — 
has the intent and the effect of signaling to workers that unionization, although available as a 
formal legal matter, is unavailable as a practical matter.      
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are openly supportive of union organizing efforts face “the [employ-
ment] equivalent of capital punishment.”128  The effect on the em-
ployees actually discharged is literally to deprive them of the option of 
unionization: no longer employed by the employer, the discharged 
worker has lost her chance to support and ultimately join the union.  
But the signaling effect of such discharges extends beyond those work-
ers actually removed from the workforce.  The message sent by such 
discharges to the workforce as a whole is that support for unionization 
carries with it the very real risk that one’s employment at the firm will 
end.129 
Of course, discharging an employee for supporting unionization is 
an unfair labor practice, and reinstatement is available as a remedy.130  
As I have noted in a previous article, however, the weakness of the 
NLRB’s remedial arsenal has rendered this unfair labor practice 
charge nearly meaningless.131  Even in cases where the Board pursues 
and successfully prosecutes a discharge case, it takes the Board ap-
proximately two years to issue a reinstatement order.132  Thus, in al-
most every instance, a union supporter discharged for organizing activ-
ity will remain out of the workforce for the entire life of the 
unionization effort.133  To the extent that other employees involved in 
an organizing effort understand discharge as the potential price for 
supporting unionization, their choice on the question should not be 
understood as autonomous or free. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  128  Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 421 (1981) (quoting M. Jay Whitman, 
Wildcat Strikes: The Unions’ Narrowing Path to Rectitude?, 50 IND. L.J. 472, 481 (1975)). 
  129  In Bronfenbrenner’s recent study, 34% of employers fired at least one union activist during 
the organizing campaign.  Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred, supra note 32, at 10 tbl.3. 
  130  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (2006); id. § 160(c). 
  131  See Sachs, supra note 121, at 2694–97. 
  132  See id. at 2695. 
  133  In Bronfenbrenner’s 2000 study, employees discharged for union activity were reinstated 
before the election was held in only 3% of the cases where unfair labor practice charges were 
filed.  BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 33, at 74 tbl.9.  As Morris concludes, a “belated reins-
tatement does nothing to repair the damage caused by the chilling effect on unionization resulting 
from the discharge.”  Morris, supra note 37, at 338.  Morris also notes that “59 percent of em-
ployees who had been offered reinstatement refused to accept it, mostly (88 percent) because of 
their fear of company backlash; and of those who did accept reinstatement, 65.3 percent quit 
within a relatively short period of time because of what they perceived to be unfair treatment.”  
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Elvis C. Stephens & Warren Chaney, A Study of the Reinstatement 
Remedy Under the National Labor Relations Act, 25 LAB. L.J. 31, 33–34 (1974)); see also Warren 
H. Chaney, The Reinstatement Remedy Revisited, 32 LAB. L.J. 357, 360–64 (1981).  Section 10(j) 
of the NLRA gives the Board authority to seek preliminary injunctive relief in cases of retaliatory 
discharge.  See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j).  See generally Morris, supra note 37, at 345–47.  But while the 
Board formally possesses this power, it rarely employs it.  In fiscal year 2008, for example, the 
Board authorized the General Counsel to seek section 10(j) injunctions in just twenty-one cases.  
See  73 NLRB  ANN.  REP. app. at 135 tbl.20 ( 2008),  available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/ 
shared_files/brochures/Annual%20Reports/Entire2008Annual.pdf.  See generally Sachs, supra 
note 121, at 2695 n.35.    
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While the discharge of union activists is a form of coercive inter-
vention, employer threats that they will close all or part of the firm if 
the employees choose to unionize — which occurred more than half 
the time in Bronfenbrenner’s sample134 — can be a form of misinfor-
mation that interferes with autonomous employee choice.  Here, the 
message is that unionization will lead not just to the discharge of cer-
tain union supporters, but also to the loss of all employees’ jobs.  Al-
though predictions based on economic facts that unionization will lead 
to firm closure do not constitute misinformation, several pieces of evi-
dence suggest that employer statements regarding firm closure made 
during organizing drives are more likely to be threats, lacking a 
grounding in economic fact, than they are to be genuine predictions.  
To start, what employees will demand through collective bargaining 
and what an actual contract will require can only be known at the 
conclusion of bargaining and is indeterminate during the course of an 
organizing effort.  As such, it is rarely the case that employers can pre-
dict that unionization simpliciter will lead to any specific outcome.135  
Second, there is ample theoretical and empirical support for the view 
that unions will not — and most often do not — make wage demands 
that threaten the continued viability of the firm, at least in the short to 
medium term.  Unions generally do not push for contractual gains that 
“destroy the goose that lays the golden egg.”136  Third, Bronfenbrenner 
finds that actual threats of plant closure are unlikely to be related to 
the financial condition of the firm.137  In her recent study, Bronfen-
brenner reports that although 57% of employers in the sample threat-
ened full or partial closure in the event of unionization, only 15% of 
firms actually closed any part of their businesses following the union 
drive.138 
Finally, research regarding the general effects of unionization on 
firm survival and employment levels lends support to these conclu-
sions.  Thus, as reflected in a recent survey of the contemporary litera-
ture, studies report that while unionization may lead to slower growth, 
fewer expansions, and fewer firm “births,” unionization has no effect 
on firm “deaths” or on employment levels.139  In a 2004 study, for ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  134  Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred, supra note 32, at 10 tbl.3. 
  135  There are, however, reported cases where a firm’s customers have a policy of not dealing 
with unionized employers, in which case unionization itself might lead to a loss in the firm’s in-
come and thus job loss.  See, e.g., DTR Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 833 (1993). 
  136  Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Do Unions Make Enterprises Insolvent?, 52 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 510, 526 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also RICHARD B. 
FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 6 (1984).   
  137  BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 33, at vi. 
  138  Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred, supra note 32, at 10 tbl.3. 
  139  See Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions Do for Economic Performance?, in WHAT DO UN-
IONS DO?, supra note 100, at 193, 217–18.    
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ample, Professors John DiNardo and David Lee examined firms where 
the NLRB ran a union election between 1984 and 1999, a data set that 
allowed the authors to examine business survival and employment ef-
fects over periods ranging from two to seventeen years.140  The authors 
report that unionization had no significant impact on business surviv-
al.141  Similarly, the authors found that the effect of unionization on 
employment was also statistically insignificant — ranging from slightly 
positive to slightly negative.142  Professors Timothy Dunne and David 
Macpherson, in a 1994 study, and Professors Richard Freeman and 
Morris Kleiner, in a 1999 article, also conclude that unionization does 
not increase the likelihood of firm death.143  Accordingly, Professor 
Barry Hirsch concludes his review of the contemporary literature by 
writing that “the empirical literature finds that U.S. unions are asso-
ciated with slower employment growth but exhibit little or no differ-
ence in rates of business failure or survival.”144 
Like discharges of union supporters, employer statements con-
necting unionization to plant closure may violate the Act.145  Three  
factors, however, suggest that the potential for unfair labor practice 
liability is insufficient to alleviate concerns with threats of this kind.  
First, remedial weakness again renders deterrence from the unfair   
labor practice insufficient.146  Second, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  140  See John DiNardo & David S. Lee, Economic Impacts of New Unionization on Private Sec-
tor Employers: 1984–2001, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1383, 1410 (2004).  The authors observed firm exis-
tence and employment levels in 2001.  Because elections took place between 1984 and 1999, busi-
ness survival effects were averaged over periods ranging from two to seventeen years.  See id.   
  141  See id. at 1428. 
  142  See id. at 1386, 1428. 
  143  See Timothy Dunne & David A. Macpherson, Unionism and Gross Employment Flows, 60 
S. ECON. J. 727, 728 (1994); Freeman & Kleiner, supra note 136, at 526 (“[U]nions do not, on aver-
age, drive firms or business lines out of business or produce high displacement rates for unionized 
workers.”); see also Hirsch, supra note 139, at 218 (reviewing this literature).  But see Robert J. 
LaLonde et al., Using Longitudinal Data on Establishments To Analyze the Effects of Union Or-
ganizing Campaigns in the United States, 41/42 ANNALES D’ÉCONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 
155, 156 (1996) (reporting negative employment effects).   
  144  Hirsch, supra note 139, at 218.  Of course, it is something of a puzzle how or why unions 
could cause slower employment growth but not affect survival rates.  Freeman and Kleiner pro-
pose one explanation: unions will push for contract gains but will not kill the “goose that lays the 
golden egg.”  Freeman & Kleiner, supra note 136, at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Or, 
in Hirsch’s characterization, unions are “willing to drive enterprises toward the cliff but not over 
it.”  Hirsch, supra note 139, at 218.  Another possibility is that the wage premiums that unions 
bargain for allow firms to respond to economic downturns by cutting wages (through concession-
ary bargaining) rather than by contracting.  See id. (citing Darren Grant, A Comparison of the 
Cyclical Behavior of Union and Nonunion Wages in the United States, 36 J. HUM. RESOURCES 
31, 31–57 (2001)).   
  145  See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618–19 (1969); see also, e.g., Guardian In-
dus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 322 (7th Cir. 1995); Shearer’s Foods, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 1093, 
1094 (2003); Be-Lo Stores, 318 N.L.R.B. 1, 3 (1995). 
  146  The typical remedy in an unlawful threat of plant closure charge is a cease-and-desist order.  
See, e.g., Talsol Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 290, 291 (1995); Farris Fashions, Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 547, 564 
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Co.,147 the Supreme Court held that while “threats” of closure violate 
the Act, there is no unfair labor practice liability if an employer pre-
dicts “on the basis of objective fact” that the “demonstrably probable 
consequence[]” of unionization is closure.148  But the doctrine has not 
remained faithful to this distinction, and the Board on numerous occa-
sions has permitted employers to imply a causal connection between 
unionization and plant closure without the kind of support that Gissel 
seems to require.149 
Third, neither the employees nor the union involved in an organiz-
ing drive has a right to information about the actual financial condi-
tion of the firm.150  Regardless of what claims an employer makes con-
cerning the likely effects of unionization, it is under no obligation to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(1993); Ring Can Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 353, 364 (1991).  Assuming the employer challenges unfair 
labor practice liability, it will take an administrative law judge an average of about nine months 
to issue such an order; and again, by the time the order has issued the election has likely been  
held or the organizing effort terminated.  See 72 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 122, app. at 184 
tbl.23.  Even if a cease-and-desist order does issue, moreover, it merely requires the employer  
not to make another  illegal threat of closing.  In cases where the union proceeds to the elec- 
tion and loses (that is, in cases where organizing efforts are not abandoned prior to the election), 
an illegal threat of closure can also be the basis for a rerun election.  These orders are relatively 
rare, however, and generally issue only when the threat of closure is coupled with other egre- 
gious unfair labor practices.  See, e.g., BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 33, at 30.  Win rates in 
rerun elections, moreover, are significantly lower than in first-run elections.  Over the five years 
ending in 2007, the NLRB ran only 139 rerun elections.  Unions were certified in 53 (38.1%).  
During the same five-year period, the NLRB conducted 12,357 first-run elections, and 54.82% 
resulted in the certification of a labor organization.  These numbers were compiled from data 
provided in the NLRB’s annual reports from 2003–2007.  For rerun election data, see 72 NLRB 
ANN. REP., supra note 122, app. at 154 tbl.11E (2007); 71 NLRB ANN. REP. app. at 156 tbl.11E 
(2006),  available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/brochures/Annual%20Reports/Entire 
2006Annual.pdf; 70 NLRB ANN. REP. app. at 133 tbl.11E (2005), available at http://www.nlrb. 
gov/nlrb/shared_files/brochures/Annual%20Reports/Entire2005Annual.pdf; 69 NLRB ANN. REP. 
app. at 232 tbl.11E (2004),  available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/brochures/Annual 
20Reports/2004%20WholeAnnualReduced.pdf; and 68  NLRB  ANN.  REP. app. at 157 tbl.11E 
(2003),  available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/brochures/Annual%20Reports/Entire 
2003AnnualReportreduced.pdf.  For first-run election data, see 72 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 
122, at 1 (2007); 71 NLRB ANN. REP., supra, at 2 (2006); 70 NLRB ANN. REP., supra, at 2 (2005); 
69 NLRB ANN. REP., supra, at 2 (2004); and 68 NLRB ANN. REP., supra, at 1 (2003).  In Bron-
fenbrenner’s 2000 study, unions won none of the rerun elections in which the employer had made 
a plant closing threat during the original election campaign.  See B RONFENBRENNER, supra 
note 33, at 30. 
  147  395 U.S. 575. 
  148  Id. at 618. 
  149  For several particularly stark examples, see Smithfield Foods, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 1225, 1226 
(2006); Stanadyne Auto. Corp., 345 N.L.R.B. 85, 88–89 (2005); and Mt. Ida Footwear Co., 217 
N.L.R.B. 1011, 1012–14 (1975). 
  150  Employers have a duty to furnish information to the union during collective bargaining, but 
this obligation arises only when there is a duty to bargain — that is to say, after the union has 
been recognized as the exclusive representative of employees in the bargaining unit.  See, e.g., 
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (holding that 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) imposes a duty 
to furnish information during bargaining).  There is no obligation to bargain, and no obligation to 
provide information, during the organizing campaign.     
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provide employees with information to verify these claims.  As such, if 
management raises the prospect that unionization will lead to closure 
or loss of jobs, employees have no way to know whether the suggestion 
is likely to be accurate — that is, whether it is a “prediction” or a 
“threat.”151  When management intervention in the employee organiz-
ing process takes the form of discharge of union activists or the threat 
that unionization will result in closure of the firm, the intervention can 
be expected to influence employee choice on the union question.  But 
these interventions influence employee preferences in ways that are in-
consistent with autonomous choice, and thus, employer interventions 
in the organizing process that take this form make departing from the 
nonunion default more difficult in a manner that we cannot attribute 
to free employee choice.152 
3.  Departing from the Nonunion Default. — Because we must as-
sume complete uncertainty regarding actual employee preferences on 
the union question, as long as the factors discussed above make it any 
more difficult for employees to choose union rather than nonunion 
bargaining (if these factors make a nonunion default even 1% more 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  151  See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618. 
  152  Deliberative democratic theory offers another useful lens through which we might assess 
employer intervention into the employee organizing process.  See Barenberg, supra note 5, at 794–
801 (explaining the relevance of deliberative democratic theory in the union context).  Although 
anything approaching a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, a few quick points bear 
mention.  Central to all conceptions of deliberative democracy is the view that autonomous prefe-
rence-formation requires some measure of equality among the parties to the deliberative process.  
See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 29–30 (1991); CASS R. SUNS-
TEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 137 (1993); Cohen, supra note 16, at 74.  What kind of 
equality is required?  Professor Joshua Cohen argues that parties must be both formally and sub-
stantively equal.  As he writes, “participants are substantively equal in that the existing distribu-
tion of power and resources does not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, nor does 
that distribution play an authoritative role in their deliberation.”  Id. at 74; see also FISHKIN, 
supra, at 29 (arguing that political equality must be reflected not only in formal decision rules, but 
also in the “background conditions that set the stage for participation in those formal decision-
rules”). 
    For these theorists, substantive equality among participants in the decisionmaking process is 
necessary to ensure that the decisions arrived at through that process are based on autonomous 
preferences.  See Cohen, supra note 16, at 77–78.  In the employment relationship, employees and 
employers are neither formally nor substantively equal.  See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 5, at 959.  
And although it may be impossible — perhaps not even desirable — to eliminate this form of in-
equality, deliberative democratic theory suggests that in order for a decisionmaking process like 
unionization to be anything like democratic, the process might have to be “insulated” from this 
asymmetric power differential.  See, e.g., Harry Brighouse, Egalitarianism and Equal Availability 
of Political Influence, 4 J. POL. PHIL. 118, 120 (1996).  To the extent that employees can conduct 
and complete the organizing process without managerial intervention, employee decisionmaking 
can be — at least in part — insulated from the employer’s power over their “short- [and] long-
term fate.”  Barenberg, supra note 5, at 935.  Indeed, Barenberg predicts this argument, writing 
that “the ideal of egalitarian deliberation among workers casts doubt on the now-widespread and 
lawful managerial practice of deploying supervisors and other managerial personnel to campaign 
against unionization.”  Id. at 801.      
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“sticky” than a union default), a preference-eliciting or reversible de-
fault approach is appropriate.153  And, indeed, given the evidence we 
have on the effectiveness of employer interventions and given the 
asymmetric nature of the collective action problems discussed above, a 
1% differential seems a conservative estimate. 
Of course, in the context of a union default rule, we should expect 
unions to discourage employees from choosing nonunion bargaining 
just as — under the nonunion default — employers intervene to dis-
courage unionization.  In a unionized firm, for example, the union 
could deploy social sanctions against anti-union employees and might 
also decline to provide vigorous representation in grievance proceed-
ings to employees who favor decertifying the union.154  These dynam-
ics could mitigate some of the asymmetric stickiness of the two default 
rules, but several factors suggest that they would not eliminate the 
asymmetry.  First, whatever force these forms of union authority have, 
they are not as powerful as those possessed by the employer in the 
nonunion workplace — exemplified by the ability to control wages and 
working conditions, discharge employees, and credibly threaten to 
terminate operations.155  Second, in considering the comparative stick-
iness of the different default rules, it is relevant that the employer’s au-
thority in a unionized workplace — and thus its ability to encourage 
decertification — is far greater than the union’s authority in a non-
union workplace.156  Finally, irrespective of the results of a campaign 
to certify or decertify a union, the employer will remain the employees’ 
employer.  In contrast, the union’s existence at the firm is contingent 
on the outcome of the campaign, another asymmetric dynamic that in-
creases the salience of threats made by an employer relative to those a 
union might deliver.  As noted above, a preference-eliciting or reversi-
ble default approach is appropriate so long as there is a slight differen-
tial in the ease of departure between the two default rules.  According-
ly, so long as the employer’s ability to deter unionization is slightly 
greater than the union’s ability to deter decertification, the approach 
advanced here is appropriate.157 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  153  See ELHAUGE, supra note 6.   
  154  Such conduct would likely constitute a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation.  
See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185–86 (1967). 
  155  In the contemporary setting, the social sanctions available to unions are often notoriously 
weak.  For a theoretical account, see generally SAMUEL B. BACHARACH ET AL., MUTUAL AID 
AND UNION RENEWAL 1–6 (2001).   
  156  See discussion infra section IV.A, pp. 701–06.  Even in a nonunion workplace, union orga-
nizers and some particularly located employees will possess certain forms of authority vis-à-vis 
other employees.  These forms of authority, as I discuss below, are relevant to the question of 
whether an open decisional process is appropriate.  See infra Part V, pp. 712–27.  What matters 
here is merely the comparative point. 
  157  In the context of a union default, an altering rule like card check would enable employees to 
minimize union intervention in their decertification efforts.    
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Before moving on, it is worth noting, by way of contrast, that Pro-
fessor Barenberg concludes that setting union bargaining as the default 
rule might be appropriate, but his conclusion is based on the view that 
most employees likely prefer unionization.158  As he writes, “on bal-
ance, the default state of unionization would more accurately reflect 
the undominated long-term subjective preferences of employees in the 
current economic environment.”159  This rationale is different than the 
one offered here.  The argument here assumes, as indeed the statutory 
regime requires us to assume, complete uncertainty about employee 
preferences.  Thus, the argument here, unlike Barenberg’s, is that a 
union default maximizes employees’ ability to choose between union 
and nonunion bargaining, not that a union default better captures em-
ployee preference for unionization.160 
4.  Maximizing Employee Choice with a New Altering Rule. — As I 
have shown, the preference-maximizing aims of a preference-eliciting 
or reversible default regime can be accomplished in two ways.  First, 
labor law could impose a default rule of union bargaining.  Second, 
Congress could change labor law’s altering rule in a way that mini-
mizes the asymmetric stickiness of the nonunion default.  In our con-
text, because the relevant asymmetry flows from management’s oppo-
sition to unionization and its ability to intervene in the employee 
organizing process, an altering rule that eliminates or minimizes man-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  158  See Barenberg, supra note 5, at 960. 
  159  Id. 
  160  The analysis in this Part is based on the fact that nearly all employers oppose unionization.  
We should account for the situation where employers support unionization.  In that setting, be-
cause of managerial support for unionization, management’s ability to overcome collective action 
problems, and the like, it might well be easier for employees to depart from the nonunion default 
than from a union default rule.  As such, the nonunion default is the reversible default when an 
employer supports unionization, and there would be no need for an asymmetry-correcting altering 
rule.  But there would be no harm from such an altering rule either, as long as it is properly con-
structed.  Under card check and rapid elections, where an employer supports unionization, unions 
and employees will have no incentive to keep management out of the organizing process.  To the 
contrary, they will keep management involved in order to encourage employees to support the 
move to unionization.  As such, under either card check or rapid elections, organizing would pro-
ceed in the same manner as under traditional NLRA rules.  If the workforce did choose to union-
ize, moreover, an altering rule like card check or rapid elections would enable employees who pre-
fer nonunion bargaining to minimize employer and union interventions in their efforts to decertify 
the union. 
    As currently structured, however, card check does present a serious problem at the decision-
al moment when the employer is supportive of unionization.  The vulnerabilities of an open deci-
sionmaking process are exacerbated when both management and the union have an incentive to 
pressure employees to sign cards.  So secrecy, of one form or another, becomes even more critical 
in the case of pro-union employers.  As noted, and as explained below, I propose two variants of 
card check that preserve decisionmaking secrecy.  See infra Part V, pp. 712–27.    
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agement’s ability to intervene in the unionization effort can correct the 
relevant asymmetry.161 
Although the argument here provides conceptual justification for 
either a new default of unionized collective bargaining or a new alter-
ing rule, several considerations point in the direction of adopting a new 
altering rule and not a new default.  The first of these considerations 
flows from the dynamic nature of workforces.  That is, even if a firm 
begins its life with a union default, each time a workforce decides to 
depart and choose nonunion bargaining, the “default” position for all 
future workforces at that firm becomes nonunion bargaining.162  
Without an asymmetry-correcting altering rule, this nonunion position 
will exhibit precisely the same problems vis-à-vis future workforces — 
precisely the same stickiness — as a nonunion default set by law.  As 
such, even were we to adopt a union default rule, we would also need 
an asymmetry-correcting altering rule.163 
Given dynamic workforces, therefore, the choice is not between 
adopting a union default or an asymmetry-correcting altering rule.   
Rather, to maximize employee choice we must choose between adopt-
ing either a union default and an asymmetry-correcting altering rule or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  161  In his work on waivable employee rights, Sunstein raises the potential benefits of a union 
default rule.  He neither endorses nor opposes such a rule, but writes that “[i]t is easy to imagine 
an unusual regime, in which workers are presumed to favor collective organization, but in which 
they are permitted to vote otherwise.”  Sunstein, supra note 11, at 256.  For Sunstein, a union de-
fault would have the advantage of serving as an “information-forcing default rule” — that is, it 
would help us “untangle” the question of whether the “failures of unionization stem from worker 
preferences or from employer pressure.”  Id. at 257.  While information-forcing default theory is 
distinct from both preference-eliciting and reversible default theory in important respects, Sun-
stein’s observation is consistent with the benefits of a union default noted above.  Sunstein does 
not discuss altering rules and thus does not assess the merits of adopting an asymmetry-correcting 
altering rule instead of changing the default. 
  162  See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 5, at 960 (“The appeal of mandating unionization as the 
workplace default position is somewhat (although, to my mind, not decisively) diminished so long 
as workers are allowed to choose authoritarian workplace governance.”). 
  163  Once a firm moves from the nonunion default to the union alternative, unionization be-
comes the effective default position for future workforces.  In this setting, managerial opposition 
to unionization no longer hinders departure from the default position and, indeed, management 
may try to encourage workers to depart and return to nonunion bargaining.  There is therefore no 
call for an altering rule that enables employees to minimize managerial intervention when the 
workplace is already unionized.  But, again, there is no harm from such a rule either.  Employees 
who wish to depart from this union default — to decertify the union, in the parlance of current 
NLRB rules — will have no incentive to keep management out of the process, and so “decertifica-
tion” organizing under a card check or rapid elections regime would function essentially as it does 
today.  To the extent that the union might be able to interfere with employee efforts to move to 
the nonunion position, however, a card check–like altering rule would enable employees to minim-
ize union interference.  In any event, because of both the union’s and management’s interest in 
the outcome of such a campaign, confidentiality at the moment of decision — as ensured by the 
proposals I offer below — would be crucial.    
2010]  EMPLOYEE CHOICE  695 
adopting just the new altering rule.164  Although there is no conceptual 
reason to favor a nonunion over a union default — so long as either is 
paired with an appropriate altering rule — there are clear pragmatic 
reasons to favor the nonunion default coupled with an asymmetry-
correcting altering rule.  To state the obvious, under current condi-
tions, a union default would encounter practical and political obstacles 
of such scale as to render the prospects for such a proposal exceedingly 
improbable. 
The political obstacles in the way of a union default rule are pro-
found.  Indeed, it is unlikely that a proposal for a union default would 
garner a single vote in Congress.  This observation led Barenberg to 
locate the prospects for a union default in the “political ozone.”165  
Beyond the lack of political potential, however, a union default would 
encounter practical problems that stem from current levels of union 
density.  More than 92% of private sector workers in the United States 
are now nonunion.166  Thus, a union default would require nearly all 
of the private employers in the country to reorganize their labor-
management relations systems in relatively short order.  Of equal con-
cern, the imposition of default unionism would cause deep practical 
problems for workers and unions.  If the new default unions were 
simply internal to individual firms — if they had “no outside power 
base or organizational structure” — they would be subject to capture 
by employers.167  If the history of company unionism is any guide,168 
in order to ensure effective default unionism, the law would need to 
require representation by an organization that had an organizational 
existence “outside as well as inside the workplace.”169  It is not, how-
ever, possible to impose through legislative change the organizational 
capacity that would be necessary for U.S. unions — or other institu-
tions — to provide adequate representation for an additional one hun-
dred million workers.170  Unlike a change to a default rule of statutory 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  164  Bebchuk and Hamdani point out that in certain contexts an asymmetry-correcting altering 
rule may not be a perfect substitute for the reversible default.  See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra 
note 6, at 506.  This is true where the coordination costs involved in departing from one default 
are greater than those involved in departing from the other default, even when an appropriate 
altering rule is in place.  See id.  In our context, the introduction of the asymmetry-correcting al-
tering rule should minimize the asymmetry in these costs. 
  165  Barenberg, supra note 5, at 961. 
  166  See Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Mem-
bers Summary (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
  167  Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 363 (2005); see also id. at 364 (“Part of what makes unions effective . . . is 
that they exist both inside and outside the workplace . . . .”). 
  168  See generally Barenberg, supra note 5. 
  169  Estlund, supra note 167, at 364. 
  170  There are now approximately 8,000,000 workers in unions out of approximately 108,000,000 
workers in the private sector labor force.  See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
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interpretation or corporate governance, a new default rule for labor 
law would depend upon a massive increase in the organizational and 
representational capacity of worker organizations, an increase that 
would not be achievable in the foreseeable future.  Absent that capaci-
ty, the practical result of a new requirement that firms be union by de-
fault would likely be either sham representation — which would, in 
the end, mean unions captured by employers — or simply an inability 
to meet the law’s requirement in the vast majority of workplaces. 
An asymmetry-correcting altering rule that minimizes employer in-
tervention in union organizing avoids these problems while accom-
plishing the same preference-maximizing aims.  First, under card 
check or rapid elections, employers would only be required to recog-
nize a union when the union demonstrates that it has support of the 
majority of the relevant workforce; change would be incremental, and 
there would be no requirement that 92% of the nation’s private busi-
nesses do anything all at once.  Similarly, union growth would be far 
more organic under a new altering rule than under a union default.  
This result is significant because, as is the case today, union growth 
would be constrained by unions’ capacity to organize new workers.  
This constraint implies that as new workers are added to union mem-
bership, unions concomitantly will develop the organizational capacity 
to represent them effectively.  And politically, of course, changing labor 
law’s altering rule is far more viable than imposing a union default.171 
Because we can maximize employee preferences with an asymme-
try-correcting altering rule, and because a union default would not be 
sufficient, maximizing employee choice with a new altering rule makes 
pragmatic sense.172  That is the approach I explore in the final Parts of 
this Article. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
LABOR, CURRENT  POPULATION  SURVEY tbl.42 ( 2008),  available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/ 
cpsaat42.pdf (reporting that in 2008,  108,073,000 private sector workers were employed in the 
United States while 8,265,000 private sector workers were union members). 
  171  Future research might explore the contours of a union default rule, addressing questions 
including what form mandatory unionization would take and whether, specifically, workers might 
be given a menu of representational options. 
  172  Professors Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky recently conducted a survey of 430 workers who 
had participated in either an NLRB election or a card check campaign in 2003.  See Adrienne E. 
Eaton & Jill Kriesky, NLRB Elections Versus Card Check Campaigns: Results of a Worker Survey, 
62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 157 (2009) [hereinafter Eaton & Kriesky, Results of a Worker Survey].  
They conclude that their data “point[] to the central role of management in making the decision to 
unionize more difficult for workers, and the success of card check procedures in reducing these 
obstacles.”  Id. at 169.  They also report, perhaps in tension with their overall findings, “that the 
percentage of workers who said they felt free to choose whether or not to support the union did 
not differ between elections and card checks.”  Id. at 170.  Because of the distinctions between the 
organizing contexts that Eaton and Kriesky studied and the proposed regimes examined in this 
Article, I do not rely on the Eaton and Kriesky data here.  Eaton and Kriesky’s study involved 
firms that had not only voluntarily agreed to accept the results of a card check process, but, in 
sixty-one of sixty-three cases, had also committed to some form of “neutrality” with respect to 
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5.  The Inadequacy of Traditional Enforcement. — Before turning 
to that discussion, however, a few words about the possibility for a 
more traditional enforcement approach are in order.  Might we alle-
viate the asymmetric impediment to departure from the nonunion de-
fault simply through better enforcement of the NLRA’s existing prohi-
bitions on anti-union conduct?  For several reasons, more rigorous 
enforcement of existing law is unlikely to be sufficient.  First, as dis-
cussed above, part of the relevant asymmetry flows from traditional 
collective action problems that inhibit unionization but would not 
hinder the move away from a union default.  Again, employers control 
the “physical and communicational life of the workplace”173 and may 
ban much speech about unionization on company property and prohi-
bit union organizers from entering company property.  Employees who 
wish to unionize therefore bear the coordination costs of identifying 
and contacting other employees during nonwork time and at nonwork 
locations.  At the same time, management is entitled to use the 
workplace to discourage unionization through communications deli-
vered in one-on-one meetings or to the workforce as a whole.174  All of 
this conduct is entirely legal under current NLRA rules, and thus bet-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
their employees’ decision to unionize.  Id. at 163.  Card check and neutrality agreements of this 
sort, unlike the card check regime I discuss in this Article, contain contractually negotiated re-
strictions on management behavior — ranging from full to partial neutrality on the union ques-
tion — during organizing campaigns.  See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 29, at 824–27.  Such agree-
ments also quite often contain other relevant provisions, including the employer’s commitment to 
allow union organizers access to employer property.  See id. at 826.   
   Importantly, the ability of such agreements to minimize managerial intervention does not 
depend on employees’ conducting the organizing campaign without managerial knowledge in the 
way that a pure card check regime — like the one contemplated by EFCA — does; indeed, in 
card check and neutrality agreements the union generally must inform the employer that the or-
ganizing is underway in order to trigger the neutrality commitment.  See, e.g., Verizon Info. Sys., 
335 N.L.R.B. 558, 559 (2001) (“Shortly after execution of the [card check and neutrality] Agree-
ment, the [union] contacted the Employer about organizing employees covered by the Agree-
ment.”); United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied-Indus. & SWIU, Case No. 
18-CB-4586, 2007 NLRB GCM LEXIS 10, at *2 (NLRB Office of Gen. Counsel May 31, 2007) 
(“[T]he Union invoked the Neutrality Agreement in order to begin organizing the . . . employ-
ees . . . .”).  Given these contextual differences, I do not rely on Eaton and Kriesky’s 2009 survey 
for the analysis in this Article.  I do note that in an earlier study, Eaton and Kriesky found that 
unionization success rates were higher under pure card check agreements (that is, voluntarily ne-
gotiated agreements between unions and employers that contained a card check recognition 
process but not a neutrality commitment) than under NLRB elections during the period of their 
study (62.5% versus 45.6%).  See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neu-
trality and Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 51–52, 52 tbl.3 (2001).  In 
this earlier study, 8.1% of the agreements in the authors’ sample contained a card check provision 
but not a neutrality commitment.  See id. at 47 tbl.1. 
  173  Barenberg, supra note 5, at 934. 
  174  See supra p. 683.    
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ter enforcement would do nothing to alleviate this conduct’s contribu-
tion to the asymmetric stickiness of the nonunion default.175 
Several of the forms of managerial intervention I have described, 
however, are prohibited under current law.  Discharging an employee 
for supporting a union campaign is an unfair labor practice, as is 
threatening to close the firm in response to unionization.  Prohibitions 
on these forms of conduct are underenforced,176 and greater enforce-
ment by the NLRB would likely deter some of the illegal behavior.  
But even here, increased enforcement of existing law is unlikely to 
prove a sufficient deterrent.  For example, discharging a union activist 
is an effective means of averting unionization, and management may 
therefore view such discharges as a potential — and quite significant 
— source of cost savings for the firm; by firing one or several union 
supporters now, management may be able to avoid, for example, the 
wage premiums associated with unionization over the long run.177  
The sanctions available to the NLRB under current law are insuffi-
cient to change this calculus.  Thus, although the NLRB can order an 
employer to pay back wages to employees who are discharged for un-
ion activity, such awards must be exclusively compensatory.  No puni-
tive awards of any kind are available,178 and employees must mitigate 
damages by attempting to find alternative employment.179  As such, 
even in a world of perfect enforcement, the harshest penalty an em-
ployer can face for discharging a union supporter is payment of the 
wages the employee would have earned absent the discharge, minus 
what the employee earned through alternative employment.  Thus, it 
often would remain the “economically rational choice”180 to discharge 
union supporters, even with perfect enforcement of existing law. 
Even complete enforcement of existing law, therefore, would not 
remove the asymmetric impediments to unionization that flow from 
managerial opposition.  We might do better, of course, by changing 
some of the NLRA’s substantive rules and by increasing the strength 
of the remedial regime.  For example, the statute might be amended to 
allow fuller communicational rights for employees at work and greater 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  175  A new altering rule like card check would leave in place restrictions on union activity in the 
workplace, but it would minimize management’s opportunity to use the workplace — like any 
location — to campaign against unionization while a campaign for unionization is underway.  
  176  See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 121, at 2694–97; supra pp. 687–88. 
  177  See David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages Now 
and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO?, supra note 100, at 
79, 82–83, 84 tbl.4.2. 
  178  See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940); Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970). 
  179  See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198–200 (1941).   
  180  Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized 
Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 63 (1993).    
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workplace access for union organizers.181  In addition to the current 
compensatory awards available to the NLRB, Congress might allow 
for enhanced or punitive damages.182  And, to ensure that discharged 
union supporters are returned to work quickly, an amended statute 
could provide for preliminary injunctive relief183 or perhaps allow for 
a private right of action.184 
Some or all of these sorts of amendments to the NLRA would like-
ly reduce the prevalence of the previously described forms of mana-
gerial intervention into the union organizing process, and such changes 
to the statutory regime might well be justified on the choice-
maximizing grounds discussed above.  To be sure, the argument here is 
not that a new default or altering rule is the sole means of increasing 
the satisfaction of employee preferences, just that it is a conceptually 
appropriate and potentially effective one.  Indeed, certain changes to 
the traditional regime might be made in conjunction with a new alter-
ing rule: for example, enhanced damages and better access to prelimi-
nary injunctive relief could act as a backstop to the new altering rule 
and help ensure that where the organizing technology fails, manage-
ment is nonetheless deterred from taking illegal action.185   
Although a discussion of the relative merits of other approaches to 
maximizing employee choice is beyond the scope here, it is worth ob-
serving that a new altering rule may have certain advantages over 
even an enhanced version of the current regime.  Unless union orga-
nizing campaigns can be conducted and completed outside the 
workplace — outside the purview of managerial intervention — em-
ployee choice will continue to depend on direct legal regulation of ma-
nagerial conduct.  As the seventy-year history of the NLRA itself sug-
gests, however, it is exceedingly difficult to design an enforceable set of 
rules to directly prevent managerial intervention in union organizing.  
The problems are well known and well documented.186  T o start, en-
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  181  For recommendations along these lines, see, for example, Estlund, supra note 105, at 353–
55. 
  182  Indeed, EFCA contains enhanced remedies for certain unfair labor practices.  See Employee 
Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).  Many academic observers have recom-
mended enhancing the damages available under the NLRA.  See, e.g., GOULD, supra note 46, at 
166 (“Double or triple back-pay awards would reduce the incentive for employers to engage in 
unlawful discriminatory dismissals.”); WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 5, 
at 247–48; Gottesman, supra note 180, at 75 (“[T]he solution is punitive damages . . . .”). 
  183  For proposals along these lines, see, for example,  Morris, supra note 37, at 358; see also 
WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 5, at 243.   
  184  See Estlund, supra note 33, at 1551–58. 
  185  As currently drafted, EFCA would increase backpay awards to an amount equal to three 
times what the employee would have earned absent the discharge.  In cases of willful or repeat 
offenses, the bill would add a civil penalty of $20,000 per violation.  See Employee Free Choice 
Act of 2009, H.R. 1409. 
  186  For a general account, see Estlund, supra note 33, at 1537.    
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forcement depends upon reporting by employees and therefore can be 
subject to some of the same sorts of managerial interference as is unio-
nization itself.187  In other contexts, the line between legitimate mana-
gerial discretion and illegal conduct can be hard to detect and police.  
The distinction between legitimate predictions and illegitimate threats 
of plant closures discussed above is one example; others include forms 
of retaliation less severe than discharge.188  Next, the pace of organiz-
ing campaigns and the crucial role played by momentum in unioniza-
tion efforts puts enormous pressure on the speed of legal relief, and in 
certain cases even preliminary injunctive relief can come too late.189  
Finally, in order to effectively discourage unfair labor practices like the 
discharge of union supporters, damages might have to approach — or 
perhaps exceed, if discounted for the likelihood of enforcement190 — 
the long-run wage increases management predicts the union would se-
cure for the entire bargaining unit.  This level of sanction may be 
higher than is politically palatable.191 
Adopting an altering rule like card check or rapid elections consti-
tutes a different approach to employee choice.  Rather than attempting 
to deter managerial intervention through ex post legal sanction, the 
new altering rule offers a structural solution.  It seeks, that is, to struc-
ture the organizing process in order to minimize the possibility that vi-
olations can occur in the first place.  When the altering rule is success-
ful — when employees are able to minimize managerial intervention 
— the inevitable imperfections in the enforcement apparatus cannot 
cripple the legal regime’s mechanism for ensuring employee choice.192 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  187  This dynamic is less acute when workers already have been discharged and thus have little 
left to lose from reporting an employer’s unfair labor practices.  But with respect to other con-
duct, including, for example, threats of discharge and threats of plant closings, the concern about 
future retaliation can inhibit reporting.  See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 
1999) (fear of retaliation inhibits FLSA complaints); Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: 
Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 
931, 952–53 (2007); cf. Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title 
VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473, 526–27 (2005). 
  188  See Barenberg, supra note 5, at 933. 
  189  See, e.g., Morris, supra note 37, at 338; Sachs, supra note 121, at 2695. 
  190  See, e.g., David Weil, Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: Evaluating a New Approach 
to Regulating the Minimum Wage, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 238 (2005) (exploring possible 
solutions to low enforcement rates of minimum wage laws). 
  191  See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 180, at 63–64.   
  192  Here, card check — or either of the forms of “card check 2.0” I develop below — constitutes 
a more ambitious and potentially more effective approach than does a rapid elections regime.  As 
discussed in section II.B, rapid elections provide a statutorily guaranteed window for employer 
intervention between the filing of a petition and election day.  Violations committed during this 
period of time would need to be addressed through ex post sanctions.  Unlike rapid elections, card 
check and card check 2.0 aim to close this window completely and thus to avert entirely the need 
for ex post remedies.  Again, though, even under card check or card check 2.0, legal remedies pro-
vide a backstop when the organizing technology fails.  See supra p. 699.    
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IV.  MAXIMIZING EMPLOYEE CHOICE BY MINIMIZING 
MANAGERIAL INTERVENTION 
I have argued that an asymmetry-correcting altering rule that mi-
nimizes employer intervention can maximize employee choice.  But 
enabling employees to conduct and conclude organizing campaigns 
with a minimum of managerial intervention raises a discrete set of 
questions.  The first is whether Congress should provide employers an 
affirmative right to intervene in the employee organizing process.  This 
question is implicated most starkly by card check which, again, aims 
to enable employees to complete organizational efforts before the em-
ployer is aware that a campaign is underway.  But the question is also 
relevant for a rapid elections proposal.  As noted above, a rapid elec-
tions regime would provide employers some minimum window of time 
during which they could intervene in unionization campaigns.  None-
theless, if management ought to enjoy an affirmative right to intervene 
in employees’ organizing efforts, restricting the scope of that participa-
tion to a period as short as five days would require justification.  Be-
cause, as I argue below, labor law need not provide employers an af-
firmative right to intervene, a decisional mechanism — like rapid 
elections — that limits the scope of such intervention does not deprive 
management of a right that it ought otherwise to possess.  The second 
question, implicated by both card check and rapid elections, concerns 
the loss of information available to employees in an organizing effort 
conducted with less managerial involvement.  In this Part, I address 
these two questions in turn. 
A.  Providing an Affirmative Right To Intervene? 
With respect to the first question, the claim that employers should 
enjoy an affirmative right to participate in the employee organizing 
process is grounded in the view that a union representation election, 
like a political election, is a contest between management and the un-
ion over firm governance.193  As Weiler puts it, under this view, “the 
employer is legitimately entitled to play the same role in a representa-
tion campaign against the union that the Republican Party plays in a 
political campaign against the Democrats.”194  And indeed, if a union 
election actually resolved which party governed the firm, or if unioni-
zation amounted to a shift in firm governance from sole to joint sove-
reignty, the argument in favor of employer participation would be 
strong.  But for better or worse, sovereignty in the workplace is not at 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  193  For a thorough treatment of the political election analogy in labor law, see Becker, supra 
note 5. 
  194  Weiler, Promises To Keep, supra note 5, at 1813.    
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stake in a union election.195  To the contrary, employees decide through 
the union representation process only whether they wish to bargain in-
dividually or collectively with their employer.196  If employees choose 
to unionize, the law then imposes on the employer a duty to bargain 
“in good faith” with the union on behalf of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit over “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.”197  But that is all the law requires: good faith collective 
bargaining, instead of individual bargaining, over terms and condi-
tions of employment.  As many scholars already have observed, and as 
the scope and content of this duty make clear, employees’ decision to 
bargain collectively will undoubtedly have an impact on management, 
but collective bargaining amounts to neither sovereignty nor control.198 
To start, the duty to bargain in good faith extends only to “manda-
tory subject[s] of bargaining.”199  With respect to any topic that is not 
a mandatory subject — so-called permissive subjects — the employer 
is under no obligation to engage with the union in any way.200  The 
Supreme Court, moreover, has interpreted this statutory list of manda-
tory subjects narrowly.  Most importantly for our purposes, the Court 
has excluded from the duty to bargain precisely those decisions that 
most directly implicate control of the firm.  In general terms, the Court 
has instructed that decisions that “lie at the core of entrepreneurial 
control” are definitionally beyond the scope of the bargaining obliga-
tion.201  The NLRB is thus prohibited from requiring employers to 
bargain with a union if that bargaining would “significantly abridge 
[the employer’s] freedom to manage the business.”202  Under this rule, 
the Board and the courts have held that an employer has no duty to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  195  See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 
YALE L.J. 1509, 1545–47 (1981).  Professor Katherine Stone’s piece marked a departure from ear-
lier scholarship that advanced a theory of industrial pluralism.  See, e.g., id. at 1514–15 (citing 
WILLIAM M. LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 55–56 (1959); Archibald 
Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pt. 1), 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1947)).  
  196  Again, this describes only the change in the relationship between employees and employers 
effected by unionization.  See supra note 17. 
  197  29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006);  see also  id. § 158(a)(5);  id. § 159(a) (making it an unfair labor 
practice to refuse to bargain in good faith).  The law concurrently prohibits the employer from 
bargaining directly with individual employees.  See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336 
(1944). 
  198  See, e.g., WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 5, at 258–59; Becker, supra 
note 5, at 530–31, 581; Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 
94 V A. L. REV. 1, 53 (2008); Stone, supra note 195, at 1545–47; Weiler, Promises To Keep, supra 
note 5, at 1813–14. 
  199  NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).  For a more recent 
discussion, see Pall Corp. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 116, 119–20 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
  200  See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349. 
  201  Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
  202  Id. at 213 (majority opinion).    
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bargain over investment decisions, financing decisions, advertising de-
cisions, or product design decisions.203  Nor does an employer have a 
duty to bargain over a decision to subcontract out bargaining unit 
work,204 or to close part of its business.205  Perhaps most profoundly, 
the employer has no obligation to bargain over a decision to cease op-
erating entirely.206  Thus, even if employees choose to unionize, when 
it comes to life-and-death decisions of the firm, not only does the union 
lack joint control over the decisionmaking process, but the employer 
also has no duty to engage with the union before making and imple-
menting its decision. 
Next, even regarding those subjects that fall within the scope of the 
bargaining obligation — for example, wages or work schedules — the 
rules concerning “management rights clauses” further clarify the na-
ture of unionization’s impact on firm sovereignty.  In short, although 
an employer is obligated to bargain in good faith over these mandatory 
subjects, the Supreme Court has held that an employer’s bargaining 
position may be to maintain unilateral control over the subject.  Thus, 
in NLRB v. American National Insurance Co.,207 the Court held that 
an employer does not violate its duty to bargain in good faith by insist-
ing that certain mandatory subjects be deemed the “responsibility of 
management.”208  This point is not a new one, and indeed it has been 
made repeatedly and emphatically in the literature.  Professor Craig 
Becker, for example, in his exploration of the political election analogy 
in labor law, concludes that “[t]he union election vests labor’s repre-
sentative with no sovereignty in the workplace,”209 and that “the elec-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  203  See First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676–77 (1981) (listing subjects that are 
clearly beyond the scope of the bargaining obligation because they “have only an indirect and at-
tenuated impact on the employment relationship,” id. at 677). 
  204  See Fibreboard, 379 U.S at 217–26 (Stewart, J., concurring).  If the subcontracting involves 
only “the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent 
contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment,” then it does fall within 
the duty to bargain.  Id. at 215 (majority opinion).  Under any other circumstances, there is no 
duty. 
  205  See First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 680–86.  If the partial closure is motivated by anti-
union animus, and the union can prove as much, the Board will find an unfair labor practice.  See 
Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1965). 
  206  See Textile Workers Union, 380 U.S. at 271–72. 
  207  343 U.S. 395 (1952). 
  208  Id. at 397; see also Int’l Woodworkers Local 3-10 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (upholding broad management rights clause).  If a proposed management rights clause is 
extremely broad, covering all or nearly all mandatory subjects, and is coupled with other evidence 
of bad faith bargaining, an unfair labor practice charge may lie.  See, e.g., NLRB v. A-1 King Size 
Sandwiches, Inc., 732 F.2d 872 (11th Cir. 1984).  The Board has also found an unfair labor prac-
tice where the employer insisted on incorporating its pre-unionization employment policies whole-
sale into the collective bargaining agreement.  See Radisson Plaza Minneapolis, 307 N.L.R.B. 94 
(1992), enforced, 987 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993). 
  209  Becker, supra note 5, at 581.    
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tion simply interposes the union as the agent of the employees for the 
limited purpose of bargaining with the employer.”210  Weiler similarly 
explains that “the purpose of the representation process is to permit 
employees to decide whether collective bargaining or individual bar-
gaining will better advance their own interests[, and]  .  .  .  [i]f they 
choose to deal with their employer collectively, the representation 
process enables them to license the union . . . to bargain on their be-
half.”211  But he concludes that “[a] trade union does not govern the 
employees in the unit.  Unlike an elected legislature, the union does 
not have the authority to prescribe conditions in the workplace.”212  
And the Supreme Court has given voice to this same conclusion.  In 
Gissel, the Court explained that “what is basically at stake” in the   
union election “is the establishment of a nonpermanent, limited rela-
tionship between the employer, his economically dependent employee,  
and the employee’s union agent, not the election of legislators or   
the enactment of legislation whereby that relationship is ultimately   
defined.”213 
Labor scholars have proposed a slew of metaphors to describe what 
they view as the anomalous nature of the proposition that Congress 
should afford management an affirmative right to intervene in union 
organizing efforts.  For example, Weiler suggests that an apt analogy 
to the employer in the unionization process is a foreign government in 
an American political election: although the domestic election may well 
have an impact on both the foreign government and its citizens, nei-
ther enjoys participatory rights in the American electoral process.214  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  210  Id. at 583. 
  211  Weiler, Promises To Keep, supra note 5, at 1813. 
  212  Id. at 1810.  Stone likewise concludes that “the industrial pluralist metaphor of the plant as 
a mini-democracy” is a “mere illusion.”  Stone, supra note 195, at 1566.   
  213  NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617–18 (1969).  The interest arbitration provi-
sions of EFCA, should they become law, would not fundamentally alter these facts.  Although a 
full discussion is beyond the scope here, those provisions would — in the case of a bargaining im-
passe — call on an arbitrator to derive the contract that the parties most likely would have 
reached based on the parties’ bargaining prior to the arbitrator’s intervention.  The contract 
would then remain in effect for two years, at which point the parties would return to the table for 
a second round of negotiations — negotiations that would not be subject to arbitration in the case 
of impasse.  Interest arbitration under EFCA would not enable a union to insist upon contract 
terms.  Nor would it change any of the rules concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining or 
management rights clauses.  See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 3 
(2009). 
  214  WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 5, at 259–60.  Becker points to simi-
lar analogies proffered during the congressional debates over the Wagner Act, and in particular, 
over whether employers would have a role in administrative disputes over representation.  Thus, 
the AFL’s counsel asked Congress: “[S]uppose the United States and Mexico were seeking to ad-
just a boundary matter by negotiation through commissioners.  How would it be regarded if the 
United States sought to influence the selection of certain commissioners to represent Mexico?”  
Becker, supra note 5, at 531 (quoting National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before 
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Professor Gordon Lafer suggests that unionization is more like the 
formation of a new political party than the election of a representa-
tive215 — the former a process in which individuals decide to advance 
their shared aims collectively and in which there is no call for inter-
vention from or participation by an opposing side.  Professor Matthew 
Bodie puts it most simply: “Whether I hire Joy to represent me in my 
negotiations with Earl is really no business of Earl’s.”216  None of 
these analogies is perfect,217 and others are available.  For example, 
employers themselves routinely join “associations” and appoint the as-
sociation as their agent for collective bargaining purposes.218  Although 
an employer’s choice to join such an association will impact the course 
and content of negotiations, neither employees nor unions have a right 
to intervene in an employer’s decision to join an association and to ap-
point the association as its bargaining agent.219  Another potentially 
useful analogy is to litigation, and the decision by a group of plaintiffs 
to proceed as a class.  The defendant in any such litigation setting will 
be impacted by the plaintiffs’ decision to pursue class certification, but 
the defendant has no right to intervene in the plaintiffs’ deliberations 
in order to present the arguments against proceeding as a class.  In-
deed, such intervention would likely violate legal ethics rules.220  The 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 150 (1935) (statement of Charlton Ogburn, Coun-
sel, AFL)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  215  See Lafer, supra note 46, at 83. 
  216  Bodie, supra note 198, at 53. 
  217  Lafer himself writes that “[t]here is no act in national politics that is a perfect analogy to 
union formation.”  Lafer, supra note 46, at 83. 
  218  See, e.g., The Employers Council: Union Relations, http://www.ecutah.org/union.htm (last 
visited Nov. 22,  2009); United Employers Association, Labor Relations, http://www.united 
employers.org/home/labor_relations (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).  
  219  Before the Board will certify a “multi-employer bargaining unit,” the consent of both the 
union and the employer is required.  See, e.g., Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004).  In 
such cases, the employees of several distinct employers are grouped together in a single bargaining 
unit and bargain for a single contract.  See id.  This doctrine is distinct from cases in which em-
ployers designate a collective representative, like an employer association, to bargain on their be-
half for single employer units.  In these cases, no union consent is required. 
   Corporations, of course, routinely make decisions of various kinds that have impacts on 
employees, consumers, and third parties.  Yet the fact that corporate decisions have these impacts 
almost never gives those affected groups a right to intervene in corporate decisionmaking 
processes.  Some commentators have argued that employees — whether unionized or not — 
should enjoy participatory rights in corporate governance.  See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of 
Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1998); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, 
or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 335 (2008).  
However, the law is decidedly to the contrary.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Prima-
cy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 573 (2003) (arguing 
that corporate governance is dominated by directors); Greenfield, supra, at 284–85.   
  220  The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit, for example, defense lawyers 
from communicating with represented plaintiffs, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
4.2, (2008), and they prohibit defense counsel from giving any legal advice to unrepresented plain-
tiffs “other than the advice to secure counsel,” id. R. 4.3.    
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defendant can challenge, in court and after the plaintiffs have decided 
to proceed as a class, whether the plaintiffs have in fact met the re-
quirements for class certification, just as an employer may challenge, 
for example, the eligibility of certain employees, the validity of ballots 
or cards, and the tally of the ballots or cards.  But in the litigation con-
text, the plaintiffs’ decision to seek class status is theirs alone to 
make.221 
Whatever analogy one favors, the relevant observation is that un-
ionization is a process through which employees choose to bargain col-
lectively, rather than individually, with their employers and through 
which employees designate an agent for these purposes.  The law en-
titles unions to bargain (though not over many of the most important 
decisions a firm will make), but unionization is not a process through 
which employees decide whether to assume joint sovereignty in the 
firm.  Although employers will be impacted by the choice employees 
make on the unionization question, that fact does not provide the basis 
for an affirmative right to intervene in the employees’ decisionmaking 
process.222 
B.  Information Loss 
The second question raised by an altering rule that minimizes em-
ployer intervention concerns the loss of information available to em-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  221  In certain circumstances, in order to avoid repetitious litigation, defendants can themselves 
move to have plaintiffs certified as a class.  See In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
  222  The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects, against state infringement, 
an employer’s right to speak in opposition to unions and unionization.  See Thomas v. Collins, 
323 U.S. 516 (1945).  These First Amendment rights were incorporated into the NLRA in 1947 
through section 8(c), which dictates that “[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or opi-
nion . . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression con-
tains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”  29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006).  Professor Mi-
chael Gottesman has made the point that, even under a card check regime, employers remain free 
to express their views on unionization and that a First Amendment attack on card check would 
fail on state action grounds.  He writes: 
It’s one thing to say that the government can’t muzzle an employer from expressing its 
views.  It’s quite another to say that the government has to structure its laws to provide 
employers notice about when their speech might be most efficacious.  Under EFCA, em-
ployers will remain free to voice their views about the downsides of unionization when-
ever and as often as they want.  They can rail against unions on a continuing basis, so 
long as they refrain from threats or coercion.  That’s all the First Amendment guaran-
tees them. 
Posting of Michael H. Gottesman to American Constitution Society Blog, The Improbable Claim 
that EFCA Is Unconstitutional, http://www.acslaw.org/node/12895 (Feb. 4, 2009, 09:39).  It is also 
true that the Court’s holding in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, was based on the fact that the 
union organizing process was structured by Congress as an electoral process.  See Becker, supra 
note 5, at 543–47.  If EFCA or subsequent legislation were to provide nonelectoral means through 
which employees could organize unions, the reasoning of Thomas may no longer hold.  Under a 
rapid elections regime, management would have a statutorily guaranteed window — albeit a mi-
nimal one — to campaign against unionization before employees vote.    
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ployees.  The argument here is that full employer participation is re-
quired in order to ensure that employee choice on the union question is 
fully informed.  For example, Epstein argues that: 
Employer speech provides valuable information to workers.  Workers need 
to be able to form an educated view on the long-term implications of un-
ion representation, which includes some estimate as to how well employees 
think the union and employer will work together on points of common 
concern.  Employees can form that judgment only by collecting informa-
tion from all sides.223 
Outside the legal academy, former NLRB member Charles Cohen con-
tends that only the NLRB election process, with employer participa-
tion, can ensure a “fully informed electorate.”224 
Provision of information is generally good,225 and in an employee 
organizing campaign conducted with less employer intervention, em-
ployees may receive less information from their employer regarding 
management’s views on unionization.226  Such information loss would 
constitute a cost of an asymmetry-correcting altering rule that mini-
mizes employer intervention.  But, for several reasons, the cost to em-
ployee choice from this information loss is likely to be low and unlikely 
to outweigh the choice-maximizing advantages that flow from an 
asymmetry-correcting altering rule.227 
First, even under a card check regime, in which management 
would have no statutorily provided window to intervene prior to a 
demand for recognition, management would remain free to, and in-
deed would have a new incentive to, present its general views on unio-
nization on a more continuous basis.  Management, that is, could 
“weave a lawful ‘anti-union campaign’ into the organizational warp 
and woof of the enterprise,”228 informing employees when they are 
hired, as well as during regular intervals, why it believes that unioni-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  223  Epstein, supra note 91, at 25. 
  224  Emerging Trends in Employment and Labor Law: Labor-Management Relations in a Global 
Economy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on 
Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 30 (2002) (statement of Charles I. Cohen, Senior Partner, 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP) (testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).    
  225  See Estlund Testimony, supra note 46, at 16 (“Information is good.”). 
  226  In their 2009 study, Eaton and Kriesky asked workers if they had “enough information 
about three items to make an informed decision about union representation.”  Eaton & Kriesky, 
Results of a Worker Survey, supra note 172, at 168.  They found that “workers in card check cam-
paigns were generally somewhat less satisfied with the amount of information they had than were 
workers in elections.”  Id.  The authors also report, however, that the “vast majority” of workers 
who actually signed authorization cards “felt they had enough information to make an informed 
decision.”  Id.   
  227  Weiler reaches the same conclusion.  See WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra 
note 5, at 261 (“My reading of the evidence about how the current lengthy representation cam-
paign has actually operated in practice leaves me quite unpersuaded of [the] net social value [of 
employer intervention].”). 
  228 Barenberg,  supra note 5, at 941.    
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zation is not in the interests of the firm.  In this respect, card check 
would require management to change the timing of its information de-
livery — it could no longer wait until an organizing drive to state its 
views on unionization — but the new rule would not disable manage-
ment from communicating its views at other moments.229  In a rapid 
elections regime, management not only could conduct such ongoing   
anti-union efforts, but also would be entitled to campaign against un-
ionization between the filing of the petition and election day.  This 
window of time would be short — again, somewhere between five 
days and two weeks — but it would nonetheless provide management 
an opportunity to express its views. 
Second, employers are not the only source of information for the 
“nonunion” side of the argument.  To the contrary, there is a set of 
third-party organizations whose raison d’être is providing employees 
with information about and arguments against unionization.  Organi-
zations including the National Right to Work Committee (and its affi-
liated Legal Defense Foundation) and the Center for Union Facts offer 
comprehensive data about every major union in the United States 
along with reports that highlight the deleterious effects of unioniza-
tion.  The Center for Union Facts, for example, has compiled a data- 
base that “contains more than 12.5 million facts about the American 
labor movement[,] [f]rom the smallest local to the largest international  
union.”230 
The Center also has made available profiles of each major U.S. un-
ion.  Each profile contains background information (including mem-
bership levels, growth trends, and salary levels of staff and leadership), 
union budget information, spending levels on lobbying and political 
activity, unfair labor practices charges filed against the union (broken 
down by type of charge), the union’s win-loss record in NLRB elec-
tions, and the union’s history of decertification elections.231  Each pro-
file also contains a narrative account of the union’s history, highlight-
ing what the Center finds most relevant.232  For example, in its profile 
of the United Auto Workers, the Center reports that the union has 
“[n]egotiat[ed] for overly generous health benefits for union members 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  229  To be sure, if management must deliver anti-union messages on an ongoing basis, it would 
not be able to offer specific information about the particular union involved in an organizing 
campaign.  But, as noted immediately below, even under current rules that permit management to 
deliver anti-union messages during the actual organizing effort, management often must rely on 
such generalized arguments about unionization.  See infra notes 240–242 and accompanying text. 
  230  Center for Union Facts, Find Your Union: Union Profiles, http://www.unionfacts.com/ 
unions (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).  
  231  See, e.g., Center for Union Facts, Union Profile: United Food and Commercial Workers 
(UFCW), http://www.unionfacts.com/unions/unionProfile.cfm?id=56 (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). 
  232  See, e.g., id.     
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[that] ha[ve] aided and abetted the decline of the auto industry.”233  
Other profiles detail allegations and reports of union corruption,234 the 
prevalence of strikes and their deleterious effects on workers,235 and 
union violence.236  The focus of these profiles is similar to the themes 
most commonly highlighted by employers during organizing cam-
paigns.237  Finally, the National Right to Work Committee and its Le-
gal Defense Foundation provide similar information to employees,238 
but, unlike the Center for Union Facts, these organizations engage in 
affirmative outreach to employees when they learn that an organizing 
campaign is underway.239 
These third-party organizations usually cannot provide information 
about an individual firm or the particular impact that unionization 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  233  Center for Union Facts, Union Profile: United Auto Workers (UAW), http://www.unionfacts. 
com/unions/unionProfile.cfm?id=149 (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).  
  234  See Center for Union Facts, Union Profile: UNITE HERE (UNITHE), http://www. 
unionfacts.com/unions/unionProfile.cfm?id=511 (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).   
  235  See Center for Union Facts, supra note 231. 
  236  See Center for Union Facts, Union Profile: AFL-CIO (AFLCIO), http://www.unionfacts. 
com/unions/unionProfile.cfm?id=106 (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). 
  237  See, e.g., Bodie, supra note 198, at 53 (“[Employers] look to disseminate information about 
the union that is negative from an employee’s perspective[, including] information about the un-
ion’s past ineffectiveness, its wastefulness of union funds, and its inability to live up to its cam-
paign promises . . . .”); see also Alfred T. DeMaria, From the Editor, Learning Lessons (Good and 
Bad) from a Real-Life Campaign, MGMT.  REP., Apr. 2001, at 3,  4–5 (listing the likelihood of 
strikes and the possibility of job loss as common employer themes).  
  238  For example, the Foundation provides information to employees concerning their legal 
rights to oppose unionization.  See National Right To Work Legal Defense Foundation, About 
Your Legal Rights: Private Sector Employee, http://www.nrtw.org/about-your-legal-rights-private-
sector-employee (last visited Nov. 22,  2009); National Right To Work Legal Defense Founda- 
tion, What Are My Rights if the Union Is Conducting a “Card Check” Organizing Drive   
at My Workplace?, http://www.nrtw.org/faq/what-are-my-rights-if-union-conducting-card-check-
organizing-drive-my-workplace (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (detailing an employee’s legal rights in 
a card check process). 
  239  In some cases, the Foundation mails literature directly to employees of the firm where   
the unionization effort is taking place.  See, e.g., National Right To Work Foundation, Why Is 
Johnson Controls Giving Your Home Address and Telephone Number to Union Organizers?, 
http://www.nrtw.org/neutrality/na_ad3.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,  2009).  In other instances, the 
Committee has garnered press attention for its efforts.  For example, at the beginning of a cam-
paign conducted by UNITE to organize Cintas laundry workers, the Committee issued a press 
release offering assistance to Cintas employees “who have been threatened by UNITE organizers 
or feel their rights have been violated.”  News Release, Nat’l Right To Work Legal Def. Found., 
Legal Foundation To Assist Cintas Employees Harassed by UNITE Union Organizers (Sept. 17, 
2003), available at http://www.nrtw.org/en/press/2003/09/legal-foundation-assist-cintas-employees-
harassed-unite-union-organizers.  The release detailed employee opposition to UNITE organizing 
efforts in other cities and reported that “in a recent National Labor Relations Board ruling, UN-
ITE was stripped of its illegally obtained bargaining power for using coercive tactics in an orga-
nizing drive in New York.”  Id.  The Cincinnati Enquirer published a short article based on the 
Foundation’s press release and included the Foundation’s contact information.  See Group Says 
Unions Pressure Workers, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 18, 2003, at 1D.    
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will likely have on that firm,240 but the type of general information 
that third parties provide is the type that employers most often com-
municate during organizing campaigns.241  This phenomenon is due 
largely to the fact that it is never possible to predict during an organiz-
ing campaign the specific impact that unionization will have on a firm.  
Thus, during the organizing phase, employers must rely primarily on 
general arguments about the effects of unionization, evidence gathered 
from past campaigns involving the same union, or more general in-
formation about the particular union involved in the campaign.  Par-
ticularly when employers rely on consultants to direct their interven-
tions, the information provided to employees follows something 
approaching a predesigned script focusing on these general themes.242 
Third-party organizations are not a perfect substitute for employer 
intervention.  Except in instances in which the organizations are suc-
cessful in their outreach efforts, the information provided by third par-
ties can be accessed only if an employee takes the initiative to access it.  
But for employees who seek out the information — and for those con-
tacted through third-party organizational outreach — these nonprofit 
organizations can provide a substantial part of the information that 
otherwise flows from employer interventions.243 
Third, as demonstrated most recently by Bodie, employers are not 
ideally suited to present to employees the “nonunion” side of the unio-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  240  There are exceptions, as illustrated by the Foundation’s work on the Cintas and Johnson 
Controls organizing campaigns.  See supra note 239. 
  241  See sources cited supra note 237.  For some illustrative accounts, see LAFER, supra note 34, 
at 13–28. 
  242  For example, the Labor Relations Institute offers a set of thirteen preprinted posters that 
address “[t]he questions most commonly asked during a union organizing campaign,” campaign 
flyers designed to “help you to further focus on issues common to most organizing campaigns,” 
and union-specific publications that “highlight[] the many restrictive rules and regulations con-
tained in the international unions [sic] constitution.”  Labor Relations Institute, http://www. 
lrionline.com/union_avoidance/campaign_literature.htm (follow “add to cart” hyperlinks for 
“campaign posters,” “campaign flyers,” and “rules of the road”) (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).  Simi-
larly, the Management Report for Nonunion Organizations offers a “sample campaign flyer” re-
garding union misuse of member dues, LAFER, supra note 34, at 23 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), and a union avoidance manual prepared by a prominent labor law firm that provides 
employers with a detailed communication plan for an “Illustrative Election Campaign,” id. at 15 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  One management periodical offers a sample speech to be giv-
en at the first sign of union activity and another sample speech to be delivered the day before the 
campaign ends.  See Lafer, supra note 46, at 86–87 (quoting Alfred T. DeMaria, From the Editor, 
Speech to Employees at the First Sign of Union Activity, MGMT. REP., Mar. 2004, at 3, 3–4; Al-
fred T. DeMaria, Sample 25 Hour Speech, MGMT. REP., Nov. 2004, at 6, 6).   
  243  We might expect a dynamic effect should EFCA, in some form, become law.  That is, as 
employer interventions decline, third parties might increase the scope of their efforts.  By contrast, 
if the existence of union campaigns is not disclosed publicly, third parties may have more difficul-
ty identifying firms for outreach efforts.    
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nization argument.244  Bodie shows that employers have different in-
centives to convey information about the drawbacks of unionization 
depending upon the employer’s view of the union’s potential 
strength.245  When the employer believes that the union is likely to be 
particularly strong — that it will effectively bargain on behalf of em-
ployees — the employer will have the “strongest incentive to defeat the 
union” and will “therefore put on the fiercest campaign.”246  In con-
trast, when the employer estimates that the union is likely to be weak-
est — in Bodie’s terms, when “the union will not be all that effective 
in improving terms and conditions” — the employer’s incentives to 
provide information change in an important way.247  Most important, 
when faced with an organizing campaign by a “sweetheart union” — 
one that has no intention of attempting to secure gains for employees 
but will merely collect dues — the employer may have an incentive to 
provide information to employees that encourages them to support the 
union drive.248  This is so because when employees join a “sweetheart 
union” they may be foreclosed from electing a legitimate union for a 
significant period of time.249  Bodie accordingly characterizes employ-
ers’ incentives to provide information to employees about unionization 
as “inverse” to employees’ interests.250 
Two final points bear mention.  First, although a decline in em-
ployer interventions will limit the amount of negative information 
about unions and unionization, employees will still have a great deal of 
information about the nonunion default, by virtue of living and work-
ing in a regime of nonunion bargaining prior to the organizing effort.  
Thus, “the employer that hired and has managed all its employees for 
a considerable time before the union even appeared on the scene has 
had ample opportunity to demonstrate the advantages of the individu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  244  See Bodie, supra note 198, at 51–55.  Becker makes a related, though distinct, argument 
about employer participation in Board representation proceedings.  See Becker, supra note 5, at 
598. 
  245  Bodie, supra note 198, at 51–55.  
  246  Id. at 54.  There is no reason to expect that employers will present either truthful or accu-
rate information intended to assist employees in making an informed decision.  The NLRB does 
not “probe into the truth or falsity of the parties’ campaign statements, and . . . will not set elec-
tions aside on the basis of misleading campaign statements.”  Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 
N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982). 
  247  Bodie, supra note 198, at 54. 
  248  Id. 
  249  The recognition of a union bars a decertification vote — and hence the possibility for 
another organizing effort — for a period of one year.  See 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(2) (2006).  The nego-
tiation of a collective agreement bars decertification for the life of the contract or up to three 
years.  Gen. Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962); see also G. Robert Blakey & Ronald 
Goldstock, “On the Waterfront”: RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 344 
(1980) (noting that contract bar doctrine is “sometimes more effective than an army of professional 
sluggers” in preventing organizing by legitimate unions). 
  250  Bodie, supra note 198, at 51.    
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al employment relationship.”251  Second, the type of information that 
employers and third parties provide during organizing campaigns is 
not likely to be new information for employees deciding whether to 
support unionization.  Far from being novel, the arguments that un-
ions are corrupt, that they charge high member dues and then waste 
them, that they are prone to violence, that they strike irresponsibly, 
and that they threaten the viability of the firm and cause job losses are 
part of our common cultural and political discourse.  They are reflect-
ed in news media reporting on unions and unionization252 and popular 
film and television accounts of unions.253 
With less managerial intervention in the union organizing process, 
employees may receive less negative information about unions.  But 
given the factors outlined here, the decline in the quantity of informa-
tion is not likely to be great and the cost of limiting this information 
will not outweigh the choice-maximizing benefits that an asymmetry-
correcting altering rule can offer. 
V.  CARD CHECK 2.0 
The appropriateness of curtailing managerial intervention in union 
organizing efforts is the central conceptual question raised by the de-
bate over EFCA.  But the EFCA debate also raises an institutional de-
sign question that merits consideration.  If minimizing managerial in-
tervention through an asymmetry-correcting altering rule enhances 
employee choice and is thus a legitimate goal for labor law, the rele-
vant institutional design question is how best to construct such an al-
tering rule.  Central to this debate — and in particular the debate over 
card check — are the questions of, first, whether an open decisional 
mechanism is necessary to achieve the legitimate substantive goal of 
minimizing managerial intervention or, second, whether openness 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  251  WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 5, at 261.  Given that the unioniza-
tion rate among private sector workers is now below 8%, the vast majority of employees in the 
United States will have spent their entire careers in the nonunion setting.  See Economic News 
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 166. 
  252  For a particularly rich contemporary example of the media’s portrayal of the alleged waste 
of union member dues, see Steven Greenhouse, At Labor Gathering, Luxury, Jockeying and Ap-
plause for Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at A22.  The article noted that “[u]nemployment 
may be soaring and the stock market tanking, but that did not stop the A.F.L.-C.I.O.’s leaders 
from gathering at the Fontainebleau hotel-resort last week, where rooms often run $400 or more a 
night.”  Id.  See generally W ILLIAM  J.  PUETTE, THROUGH  JAUNDICED  EYES:  HOW  THE 
MEDIA VIEW ORGANIZED LABOR (1992).   
  253  For contemporary television examples, see The Sopranos: No Show (HBO television broad-
cast Sept. 22, 2002); and The Wire (Season Two) (HBO television broadcast June 1–Aug. 24, 2003).  
For an example from cinema, see ON THE WATERFRONT (Columbia Pictures 1954).  Certainly 
not all film depictions are negative, perhaps most notably NORMA RAE (Twentieth Century Fox 
1979).    
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might be justified on other grounds.  In this Part, I argue that the an-
swer to both questions is no. 
Although rapid elections preserve secrecy in decisionmaking, I also 
argue here that rapid elections are not the optimal approach to mini-
mizing managerial intervention.  Accordingly, in this Part, I propose 
two new decisional mechanisms, alternatives to both card check and 
rapid elections, that achieve the legitimate asymmetry-correcting func-
tion of eliminating or minimizing managerial interference while at the 
same time preserving confidentiality in decisionmaking.  First, by 
drawing on the technology used in union elections in the airline and 
railway industries, I offer a model of confidential phone and internet 
voting.  Second, by drawing on a practice increasingly prevalent in 
U.S. political elections, I offer models of continuous in-person and mail 
ballot voting. 
A.  Preserving Confidentiality in Decisionmaking 
As I have argued, an altering rule that minimizes managerial inter-
vention in the employee organizing process is appropriate because it 
mitigates specific asymmetries in employees’ ability to depart from the 
nonunion default.  But an open decisional mechanism is not necessary 
to this purpose.  To the contrary, what is required for the asymmetry-
correcting function of minimizing managerial intervention is a deci-
sional mechanism that enables employees to register their choice on the 
union question without providing notice to management that the cam-
paign is underway.  Although such a mechanism must enable em-
ployees to vote at home or in some other nonworkplace location, open-
ness in decisionmaking is unrelated to this requirement.  
Accordingly, an open decisional mechanism cannot be justified on 
the ground that it is necessary to eliminate managerial intervention in 
unionization efforts.  Nor is openness justified on other grounds.  Not-
ably, almost none of card check’s public advocates offer a defense of 
openness.  One exception is Lafer, who argues that the act of forming a 
union involves, at its core, “workers’ pledging to each other their 
commitment to work together to secure a fair contract.”254  He notes 
that union organizers often encourage workers to “act like a union” 
prior to the time that they actually express their preference on the un-
ion question, which requires a series of public solidaristic acts, like 
sharing wage data that would otherwise have been kept secret and 
providing mutual support in trying to resolve workplace disputes.255  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  254  Lafer, supra note 46, at 84. 
  255  Id. at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted).    
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For these reasons, Lafer concludes that unionization “makes most 
sense as a public act.”256 
Granting that public manifestations of mutual support and lived 
solidaristic experience are crucial for union success,257 it is not clear 
what connection an open decisional mechanism at the end of the cam-
paign has to such conduct and experience.  Indeed, in traditional secret 
ballot elections workers are free to, and routinely do, state publicly 
their support for unionization.258  Nothing about the secret ballot in-
terferes with workers’ ability to “stand up and be counted” during an 
organizing drive.259  Similarly, it has been during NLRB secret ballot 
campaigns that organizers have developed and implemented the strat-
egy of encouraging workers to act like a union prior to voting.260  In 
short, an open decisionmaking mechanism is not necessary to these 
forms of community-building work, nor does a confidential voting 
process disable them. 
Outside the specific context of union organizing campaigns, John 
Stuart Mill famously argued in favor of open balloting in political elec-
tions.261  Mill’s argument was based on two premises.  First, Mill be-
lieved that “[i]n any political election . . . the voter is under an absolute 
moral obligation to consider the interest of the public.”262  Second, Mill 
thought that an open ballot would ensure that voters did in fact exer-
cise the franchise in the interest of the public good, rather than in a 
manner meant to further their individual interests.263  In Mill’s famili-
ar words, when citizens vote in the open — “under the eye and criti-
cism of the public”264 — they will exhibit the “best side of their charac-
ter”265 by eschewing selfish motives and voting “on public grounds”266 
alone. 
There are, however, two reasons to doubt the force of Mill’s argu-
ments here.  The first concerns our context.  Unlike political elections 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  256  Id. at 84. 
  257  See generally FANTASIA, supra note 17. 
  258  See Lafer, supra note 46, at 84–85. 
  259  Id. at 84.  
  260  See id. at 85. 
  261  See J OHN  STUART  MILL, CONSIDERATIONS  ON  REPRESENTATIVE  GOVERNMENT 
190–203 (London, Parker, Son, & Bourn 1861); see also NADIA URBINATI, MILL ON DEMOC-
RACY 104–22 (2002) (discussing Mill’s defense of the open ballot); Annabelle Lever, Mill and the 
Secret Ballot: Beyond Coercion and Corruption, 19 UTILITAS 354 (2007) (same). 
  262  MILL, supra note 261, at 193; see also id. at 202–03; URBINATI, supra note 261, at 112–13; 
Lever, supra note 261, at 355 (“Mill believes that [voters] ought to be voting solely with considera-
tions of the public good in mind.”). 
  263  See MILL, supra note 261, at 203 (“People will give dishonest or mean votes . . . more readi-
ly in secret than in public.”); URBINATI, supra note 261, at 113–15. 
  264  MILL, supra note 261, at 193.   
  265  Id. at 203. 
  266  Id. at 202–03.    
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— which assume some polis or public in whose good the voter might 
act — the question at issue in a union election is whether the workers 
wish to create such a collective.  It is less obvious, therefore, that 
workers have an obligation to vote to further the “public” good at a 
moment when they are being called on to decide whether to constitute 
a public.267  Indeed, such an obligation would predict the result that 
the decisional process is meant to determine. 
Second, even were we to posit a public whose good ought to be fur-
thered by workers voting in a union election,268 it is not clear that Mill 
is correct that voters are more likely to pursue the public good when 
voting in the open.269  Mill understood that public voting would sub-
ject citizens to psychological pressure from fellow constituents, and he 
believed that this pressure would require them to eschew private inter-
ests and vote in the interests of the whole.  Mill is undoubtedly correct 
that an open decisional mechanism increases the pressure on each vot-
er that can be brought to bear by other voters.  But whether this in-
creased pressure will necessarily incline voters toward some public 
good seems more debatable. 
Indeed, an open decisional process in union campaigns seems less 
likely to incline workers to vote according to what they think the 
common good might be and more likely to incline them to conform 
their votes to the views of two particular groups: union organizers and 
the most influential of their coworkers.  Here, Sanders’s work on open 
deliberative processes is instructive.270  Sanders shows the dispropor-
tionate influence that follows from certain statuses — including race, 
gender, and levels of education — and from behaviors often correlated 
with these markers — like speaking ability, confidence in interpersonal 
interaction, and the like.271  In the union-organizing context, and most 
acutely in low-wage organizing efforts, paid organizers may have had 
more extensive educational opportunities than have the workers them-
selves.272  They are also trained in, and likely to have extensive expe-
rience with, precisely the sort of interpersonal dynamics involved in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  267  As Professor Nadia Urbinati puts it, Mill thought “openness was meant to protect the polis,” 
not the individual.  URBINATI, supra note 261, at 112.  Where there is yet no polis to protect, the 
argument for openness loses force. 
  268  For example, the “public” might be all employees currently employed at the firm. 
  269  See, e.g., URBINATI, supra note 261, at 112 (“[T]here is no necessary connection between 
voting as duty and the open ballot.  The public good argument can justify voting as a duty, but 
does not in itself authorize openness.”). 
  270  See Sanders, supra note 19, at 362–69. 
  271  See id. at 364–66. 
  272  See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Lessons in Labor: A Course for Summer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 
1996, at B1; Steven Greenhouse, Students Looking to Unions for Careers in Social Change, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at B1.    
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discussing the signing of an authorization card,273 sources of what 
Sanders calls “epistemological authority.”274 
Moreover, as organizers and union organizing guides routinely rec-
ognize, workplaces have a core of “natural leaders” among the work-
force — employees who by virtue of their location within the firms’ 
division of labor have particular influence over other workers.275  
These workplace leaders are called on during organizing drives to 
form the organizing committee, which is often active in card-gathering 
efforts.  Even without exerting physical pressure, such workplace lead-
ers may be able to exercise more subtle but perhaps equally effective 
forms of influence — if the decisional moment is a public one.276   
A related concern is that if voting is open, workers will know that 
when the organizing campaign is concluded, their decision whether to 
sign an authorization card will be available to the union, to coworkers, 
and — if the union gathers a card majority — to the employer.  Given 
this fact of publicity, some workers may decide to sign an authoriza-
tion card out of a desire to avoid displeasing coworkers (or the subset 
of coworkers most involved in the unionization effort).  Some may de-
cline to sign a card out of a desire to avoid displeasing management.  
Others will be influenced by their predictions about the likely outcome 
of the campaign: if a worker thinks that the union will win, she may 
be influenced to sign out of a desire to avoid losing favor with the un-
ion that will eventually negotiate her contract and represent her at 
work.  In short, and even if the result is not to incline workers toward 
a single decision, public access to each worker’s decision introduces 
“posture-preferences” into the decisionmaking process — strategic vot-
ing based not on the state of affairs the worker would most like to 
bring about, but on defensive calculations geared toward the response 
that others will have to a public voting record.277 
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  273  Developing these skills is at the heart of organizer training. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, FAQs 
About the Organizing Institute, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/oi/faqs.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 
2009) (“Organizers mostly visit workers on a one on one basis, maybe in their homes or other 
places outside of work where they feel comfortable . . . .  The organizer builds relationships with 
them . . . .”); id. (“During the training, participants will learn one on one communication skills, 
campaign and strategic planning skills.”). 
  274  Sanders, supra note 19, at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  275  See, e.g., AM. FED’N OF STATE, COUNTY & MUN. EMPLOYEES, supra note 27, at 1–10; 
INT’L BHD.  OF TEAMSTERS, supra note 28, at 13 (instructing organizers to identify “natural 
leaders” in the workplace who have the most “influence among co-workers”). 
  276  It is only in an open process that workplace leaders — or others — can “verify” the way a 
particular worker votes, and thus these forms of pressure can function only in an open voting 
process.  Secrecy makes commitments to vote one way or the other inherently unverifiable.  See 
Vermeule, supra note 45, at 417.   
  277  Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit, Unveiling the Vote, 20 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 311, 322 (1990).  
It is also relevant that Mill himself believed the appropriateness of open voting to be highly con-
textual: even Mill saw the need for secrecy in contexts in which intimidation and other forms of 
undue pressure were a concern.  For example, thirty years before he wrote his defense of open 
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A more recent defense of open voting comes from political scientists 
Professors Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit.  Much of Brennan and 
Pettit’s defense follows Mill.278  But Brennan and Pettit add a new line 
of argument, contending that in large-scale electorates it is not feasible 
for voting systems to elicit voters’ actual preferences on the matter be-
ing decided.  Because the chance of any individual’s vote being deci-
sive is close to zero, these authors argue that voters will lack an incen-
tive to vote their preferences and will instead vote according to other 
considerations — for example, a desire to secure social acceptance.279  
For Brennan and Pettit, because preference voting is infeasible, voting 
systems should be designed to secure a Millian public or “judgment 
ideal” and should, following Mill, be open.280 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
voting he admitted that “the main evil to be guarded against was that which the [secret] ballot 
would exclude — coercion by landlords, employers, and customers.”  MILL, supra note 261, at 
195.  By the time of Considerations on Representative Government, however, Mill thought that 
the possibility for undue influence from landlords and employers had subsided enough to allow 
for open voting, see id., an empirical conclusion that one commentator finds “preposterous.”  UR-
BINATI, supra note 261, at 121. 
    Eaton and Kriesky report that only 5.6% of the workers in their survey who signed cards in 
the presence of a union organizer or coworker felt “pressured to sign the card” by the presence of 
the card solicitor.  Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 172, at 164.  These results may provide a basis to 
question the degree of influence actually brought to bear at the moment of decision, at least in the 
context of voluntary card check and neutrality agreements that Eaton and Kriesky investigate.  
Several points, however, warrant mention.  First, and as noted above, Eaton and Kriesky’s sam-
ple was drawn from card check campaigns conducted pursuant to voluntary agreements between 
unions and employers, and, in all but two of the campaigns studied, the employer had also agreed 
to remain neutral on the question of unionization.  See id. at 163.  It is not clear whether the in-
centives to apply undue pressure at the moment of decision, and the actual prevalence of such 
pressure, would remain the same in the context of a card check process that was legally mandated 
and that did not require employer neutrality.  Second, the authors report that 16.8% of workers 
felt pressure to support the union from coworkers, and 14% felt pressure from union staff, during 
the organizing campaign.  See id. at 165 tbl.2.  As noted, because openness allows the verification 
of commitments — including commitments elicited during the campaign — the authors’ findings 
regarding workers’ perception of pressure at the moment of signing may underreport the effects of 
an open decision process.  Finally, and perhaps most important, Eaton and Kriesky’s survey may 
not adequately capture the types of influence that concern Sanders (that is, the exercise of episte-
mological authority) or, as discussed infra p. 718, Brennan and Pettit (that is, “the warping influ-
ence of . . . posture-preferences,” Brennan & Pettit, supra, at 323). 
  278  These authors divide their analysis into a discussion of two different “ideals of voting”: a 
preference ideal and a judgment ideal.  Brennan & Pettit, supra note 277, at 313.  In the prefe-
rence ideal, individuals vote according to their overall assessment of the options available to them, 
taking into account whatever private and public interests they have.  Id.  In the judgment ideal, 
which is Mill’s approach, voters vote solely according to “what is best for all.”  Id.  Brennan and 
Pettit then argue that only the judgment ideal is feasible and, as Mill contended, that openness in 
voting will incline voters to support the public good.  See id. at 326. 
  279  See id. at 321–22.  Thus, voters may vote for candidates who favor the poor if doing so will 
endear them to peers for whom helping the poor is an important goal.  See id. at 322. 
  280  Like Mill, however, Brennan and Pettit also admit of a “practical” problem with open vot-
ing.  See id. at 328–32.  They write that where blackmail and intimidation are possible, secrecy is 
called for.  See id. at 331.    
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In union elections the electorate is far smaller than it is in large-
scale political elections: nearly a quarter of bargaining units consist of 
fewer than ten workers, and the majority have fewer than thirty.281  
Brennan and Pettit’s basic premise is therefore inapposite in our con-
text.  The chance of an individual’s vote being decisive will not be 
close to zero, and individuals will have an incentive to vote their ac-
tual preferences.282  As these authors admit, moreover, where the pre-
ference ideal is possible, openness is to be avoided: “Things would ac-
tually be worse for the preference ideal if voting were open.  The 
openness of the vote would expose the voter even more effectively to 
the warping influence of his desire for social acceptance and, more 
generally, of his posture-preferences.”283 
The arguments in support of an open decisional mechanism specific 
to union organizing are not convincing, while the arguments for open-
ness in political elections lack weight in this context.  Accordingly, af-
ter taking up the prospects for rapid elections, I develop two sets of 
decisional mechanisms designed to achieve the legitimate asymmetry-
correcting function of minimizing managerial interference while pro-
viding employees a confidential process through which to register their 
choices on the union question. 
B.  Proposals for Reform 
1.  Rapid Elections. — Before developing these new suggestions for 
institutional design, it is first necessary to assess rapid elections — the 
longstanding proposal for reform that Congress is now considering as a 
potential alternative to card check.284  As noted above, a rapid elec-
tions regime would preserve the rules for union organizing currently in 
effect, including the election petition process and the secret ballot deci-
sional mechanism.  But a rapid elections regime would mandate that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  281  See 73 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 133, at 130 tbl.17 (reporting that 22% of bargaining 
units had fewer than 10 employees, 19.7% had between 10 and 19 employees, 11.6% had between 
20 and 29 employees, 8.5% had between 30 and 39 employees, 5.2% had between 40 and 49 em-
ployees, 10.9% had between 50 and 79 employees, 5.8% had between 80 and 99 employees, 9.4% 
had between 100 and 199 employees, 3.3% had between 200 and 299 employees, and 3.6% had 
500 or more employees). 
  282  For example, the probability of casting the decisive vote in an electorate of nine employees 
— the probability that the eight “other” employees split four–four — is approximately 27%.  And, 
again, 22% of bargaining units had fewer than ten employees in 2008.  The probability of casting 
the decisive vote in an electorate of twenty-nine employees is approximately 15%, and a majority 
of bargaining units in 2008 were smaller than thirty employees.  (In these calculations, each em-
ployee has a (random) 50% chance of voting yes.) 
  283  Brennan & Pettit, supra note 277, at 323.  Such dynamics will have equal or greater force in 
union elections where the size of bargaining units is, again, generally very small.   
  284  See Greenhouse, supra note 3.  See generally WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, 
supra note 5, at 255–56; William B. Gould IV, How Obama Could Fix Labor Law, SLATE, Aug. 
29, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2198736.    
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the NLRB conduct the representation election within some set period 
of time after the petition is filed — generally between five days and 
two weeks.  To the extent that a statutory rapid elections mandate 
could, in fact, minimize the amount of time management has to inter-
vene in union organizing efforts, the proposal finds support in the 
analysis here.  Because such a regime also ensures confidentiality in 
decisionmaking, the proposal would constitute an improvement over 
the status quo. 
Despite these merits, however, there are reasons not to be entirely 
satisfied with rapid elections.  These reasons concern the proposal’s 
mechanism for minimizing managerial interference and the extent to 
which the proposal could, even if successful, minimize such interfe-
rence.  First, a rapid elections regime depends upon the NLRB to en-
sure that elections are carried out within the statutorily prescribed 
time frame.  And while legislation could mandate that the NLRB con-
duct elections within five or ten days, for example, it is far from cer-
tain that the agency would be able to run elections that rapidly.  In-
deed, the last fifty years of experience suggest strongly that there is 
nothing “rapid” about the NLRB, and despite repeated attempts to 
speed up various Board proceedings, the agency remains plagued by 
delay.285  A new congressional mandate — if paired with the substan-
tial increases in funding that such a mandate would require — might 
improve the situation.  But, as with relying on the Board to carry out 
the statute’s remedial regime,286 there is ample reason for skepticism 
about depending on the Board to ensure speedy elections. 
Second, the extent to which rapid elections can minimize mana-
gerial intervention in employee organizing efforts is inherently limited.  
In a rapid elections regime, as under current law, once employees file a 
petition for an election, the employer is given notice of the organizing 
campaign and thus has a statutorily guaranteed window of time to 
campaign against unionization.  Should the employer become aware of 
organizing efforts before the petition is filed, of course, managerial in-
tervention could begin at that point.  Like traditional card check, nei-
ther version of card check 2.0  can ensure in all instances that em-
ployees will be able to complete organizational efforts without 
managerial interference.  A rapid elections regime, however, ensures 
that this goal is never met. 
More robust institutional reform is both desirable and possible.  In 
the remainder of this Part, I develop two proposals that better achieve 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  285  See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 121, at 2695–96 & n.35.  NLRB General Counsel Fred Feinstein, 
for example, made it a priority of his administration to increase the use of the Board’s injunctive 
power to speed up the process of reinstating employees discharged for union activity but was 
largely unable to succeed.  See Estlund, supra note 33, at 1566–67. 
  286  See Estlund, supra note 33, at 1562–69.    
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card check’s organizing technological function, preserve secrecy in   
decisionmaking, and depend on more feasible expectations of NLRB  
performance. 
2.  Confidential Phone or Internet Voting: Borrowing from the 
NMB. — Although the NLRB has jurisdiction over nearly all private 
sector union elections, labor organizing and labor relations in the air-
line and railroad industries are governed by a different statute, the 
Railway Labor Act,287 and a different administrative agency, the Na-
tional Mediation Board (NMB).288  And while the basic structure of 
the representation process is the same in both regimes, the NMB relies 
on different voting technologies when conducting representation elec-
tions.  Until recently, the NMB conducted union elections exclusively 
by mail ballot.289  Under its mail balloting procedures, the NMB sends 
a ballot to each employee in the bargaining unit three weeks before the 
ballot count is to take place.290  Although all voting takes place in the 
employees’ homes (or wherever employees choose to complete their 
ballots), the NMB has repeatedly stressed the importance of secrecy in 
mail ballot elections.  In order to ensure secrecy and to prevent the 
submission of unauthorized ballots,291 the NMB assigns each employee 
a “unique key number,” which is recorded on the NMB’s eligibility list 
and on the return envelope sent with the employee’s ballot but is never 
disclosed to the union or the employer.292 
Critically, the NMB also bars unions (and employers) from gather-
ing ballots from employees or even from handling the ballots.293  In 
United Air Lines, Inc.,294 for example, the NMB held that if a union 
collects ballots from employees, even if employees have already sealed 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  287  45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2006). 
  288  See id. § 154.  One commentator has recommended using NMB voting technologies in the 
NLRA election context, following the filing of a traditional election petition.  See Labor Law 
Blog, A Proposal for Telephone & Internet Voting, http://traditionallaborlaw.blogspot.com/2008/ 
09/proposal-for-telephone-internet-voting.html (Sept. 14, 2008, 23:48). 
  289  See  In re Representation of Employees of the American Airlines, Inc., 1 N.M.B. 371,  
371 (1944); NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD REPRESENTATION MANUAL 24–28 (2009) [herei-
nafter NMB  REPRESENTATION  MANUAL],  available at http://www.nmb.gov/representation/ 
representation-manual.pdf; Pam Ginsbach, NMB Will Launch Telephone Balloting in Representa-
tion Elections Sept. 30, [2002] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 187, at A-7 (Sept. 26, 2002). 
  290  See NMB REPRESENTATION MANUAL, supra note 289, § 14.202, at 21. 
  291  See, e.g., Transp. Workers Union, 26 N.M.B. 195 (1999); United Air Lines, Inc., 22 N.M.B. 
288 (1995); see also NMB REPRESENTATION MANUAL, supra note 289, § 14.203, at 21, § 14.305-
1, at 23. 
  292  NMB REPRESENTATION MANUAL, supra note 289, § 14.203, at 21.  Each ballot also con-
tains a “non-reproducible” NMB seal.  Id. § 14.201, at 21. 
  293  See, e.g., Transp. Workers Union, 26 N.M.B. 195; United Air Lines, 22 N.M.B. 288; see also 
NMB REPRESENTATION MANUAL, supra note 289, § 14.202, at 21, § 14.303–.304, at 23.  Ac-
cording to NMB rules “only NMB agents [are to] handle ballot packages.”  Id. § 14.202, at 21. 
  294  22 N.M.B. 288.    
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their ballots in the NMB-provided return envelopes, the union com-
mits objectionable conduct that can warrant setting aside the results of 
the election.295  Further, although representatives from the union and 
employer are entitled to observe the ballot count, the NMB has 
adopted a rule to ensure secrecy in this process as well.  Thus, “[a]ll 
materials which might disclose whether particular employees cast bal-
lots or refrained from voting must be secured from view prior to per-
mitting any non-NMB employees to observe the final tabulation of the 
ballots.”296 
In recent years, the NMB has modernized its voting technology by 
adopting “telephone electronic voting”297 and internet voting.298  Al-
though the voting technologies have changed, the commitment to 
secrecy remains.  Thus, as in the mail balloting process, under the new 
systems employees vote at the time and in the place of their choosing.  
With both telephone and internet voting, each eligible employee is giv-
en a “voter identification number” (VIN) that is confidential and 
known only to the voter and the NMB.299  When voting, the employee 
either calls a toll-free telephone number or goes to a designated web-
site.  In telephone voting, employees are given a series of voice 
prompts that ask them to verify their identity by entering their VIN, 
and then to enter their vote.  On the internet, the website instructs the 
voter to follow a similar series of steps.300  Although the NMB con-
ducts the official vote count once the voting period closes, both tech-
nologies allow a continuous tallying of the votes.301  In both the tele-
phone and internet processes, the voting is entirely confidential — 
neither the employer nor the union is aware of how (or whether) any 
employee votes.302 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  295  Id. at 320 (such conduct “compromises the secret ballot process”); see also Transp. Workers 
Union, 26 N.M.B. 195.  In United Air Lines, union stewards collected already-completed and 
sealed ballots from employees.  The NMB held that this activity compromised the secrecy of the 
election.  See United Air Lines, 22 N.M.B. at 320.  Because the ballot-collection activity was not 
“systematic,” id., the NMB certified the election results but reduced the length of the certification 
bar (the period of time during which the union is insulated against any attempts at decertification) 
by six months, see id. at 321. 
  296  NMB REPRESENTATION MANUAL, supra note 289, § 14.303, at 23. 
  297  Ginsbach, supra note 289. 
  298  See National Mediation Board To Allow Internet Voting in Representation Elections, [2007] 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 185, at A-7 (Sept. 25, 2007). 
  299  Id. 
  300  See NMB REPRESENTATION MANUAL, supra note 289, § 13.204, at 17. 
  301  See Ginsbach, supra note 289. 
  302  In the context of a practice election, the NMB general counsel instructed voters that “[y]our 
VIN and PIN are confidential numbers, known only to you and the NMB.  To maintain the con-
fidentiality and integrity of the voting process, do not share your VIN or PIN with anyone.”  Let-
ter from Mary L. Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Mediation Bd., to All Carriers and Labor Organi-
zations (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.nmb.gov/representation/deter2007/34n013.pdf.    
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The phone and internet voting procedures currently used in NMB 
elections constitute one potential substitute for card check or rapid 
elections, and developing an asymmetry-correcting decisional mechan-
ism out of the NMB process would be relatively straightforward.  The 
mechanics of the procedure would be administered either by the 
NLRB or by a neutral private agency certified by the NLRB for these 
purposes (for simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the administering body as 
the “agency”).303  As they do under current NLRA procedures for elec-
tion petitions, unions would gather names of employees they believe 
work in the relevant bargaining unit.  As the union gathered names it 
would submit them to the agency.304  The agency would then send 
these employees confidential VINs along with instructions regarding 
registering their votes via phone or internet.305  The agency would not 
inform the employer that the organizing effort was underway or that 
VINs had been issued.306  Although union organizers and union sup-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  303  In some private recognition agreements, for example, an outside arbitrator conducts secret 
ballot elections in lieu of the NLRB.  See, e.g., Serv. Employees Int’l Union v. St. Vincent Med. 
Ctr., 344 F.3d 977, 980 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003); Tenet Healthcare, Inc., Case Nos. 32-CA-21266-1, 32-
CB-5769-1,  2005 NLRB GCM LEXIS 10, at *14–15 (NLRB Office of Gen. Counsel Feb. 23, 
2005).  If a private agency were chosen in this context, the NLRB would need to exercise some 
continuing oversight of the process.  A complete discussion is beyond the scope here, but for a de-
scription, along with both support for and criticism of reliance on private agencies to perform 
government functions, see GOVERNMENT  BY  CONTRACT (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow 
eds., 2009).  See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1367 (2003). 
  304  This procedure would in many ways mirror the NLRA election-petition process: under 
NLRA rules, it is the union’s responsibility to construct a list of employees it presumes to be eligi-
ble to vote, and to submit authorization cards signed by what it believes to be at least 30% of the 
eligible voters.  After the union submits its cards, the NLRB must then confirm that the union has 
in fact identified 30% of the eligible bargaining unit.  At this point, the employer is notified of the 
unionization effort and must turn over to the NLRB a current payroll list of employees — in or-
der that the Board can confirm that the union has made its 30% showing.  See  29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(c)(1)(A) (2006);  29 C.F.R. §  101.18(a) (2009);  see also  1 S ECTION  OF  LABOR  AND  EM-
PLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW § 10.I.A.1, at 543 (John E. 
Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006).   
  305  In low-wage industries, in which home addresses can be unreliable, it is possible that the 
Board would need to communicate this information via telephone.  See generally Dayna L. Cun-
ningham, Who Are To Be the Electors? A Reflection on the History of Voter Registration in the 
United States, 9 Y ALE L. & POL’Y REV. 370, 391–95 (1991) (noting that low-income voters are 
more mobile than wealthier voters and that mail is less likely to be delivered to their homes). 
  306  The discussion of employers’ affirmative right to intervene provides support for this aspect 
of the proposal.  See supra Part IV, pp. 701–12.  Moreover, while the Government in the Sunshine 
Act applies to meetings of the NLRB’s five-member adjudicatory body, it does not require open-
ness in agency activity below this level.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).  As noted immediately be-
low, employers would have the right to challenge the results of the voting as soon as it was com-
pleted, and would thus ultimately be entitled to access all of the information that is currently 
made available under NLRB rules.  Nonetheless, to prevent a practice of continuous Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests designed to discover election information while voting was un-
derway, an additional specific exception to FOIA might be in order.  The analysis — and the ap-
plicability of FOIA — might change depending on whether it is the NLRB or a private agency 
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porters would remain free to visit employees at their homes, neither 
the union nor any other employee would be involved in soliciting or 
recording the employees’ votes.  As under NMB rules, union repre-
sentatives (and employers) would be barred from assisting employees 
in entering their votes and would be barred from being present when 
employees did enter their votes.  Violation of these rules would form 
the basis for objectionable conduct, and ultimately for an invalidation 
of the results of the election. 
Because both phone and internet technologies allow constant tally-
ing of results, moreover, the agency could inform the union when it 
had reached a certain level of support among (what the union believes 
to be) the relevant bargaining unit.  Importantly, this voting technolo-
gy would allow the agency to inform the union of this support level 
without disclosing the votes of any individual employee to the union.  
Once the union believed that it had the support of more than 50% of 
the bargaining unit, it could demand recognition.  The employer   
would then be entitled to challenge — in proceedings before the 
NLRB — the eligibility of any employee included among the voters 
and the definition of the bargaining unit, and it would be entitled   
to the information necessary to mount these challenges (as it is under  
current NLRA rules).307  If, in the end, more than 50% of the em-
ployees in the bargaining unit signaled their support for the union, the  
NLRA would certify the union as the employees’ collective bargaining  
representative.308 
3.  Continuous Early Voting: In-Person and Mail Balloting. — In 
contemporary American political elections, traditional secret ballot 
voting on election day remains dominant, but an increasing percentage 
of citizens now participate through “early voting.”309  There are two 
forms: under early voting rules, citizens either mail their ballot to elec-
tion officials prior to election day, or vote early and in person at a tra-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
running the election.  See id. § 551(1) (definition of “agency”); see also Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 
169, 171 (1980) (holding that FOIA does not apply to recipients of federal grants); Irwin Mem’l 
Blood Bank of the S.F. Med. Soc’y v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1054–57 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(holding that the Red Cross is not an “agency” for FOIA purposes despite receipt of government 
funds and government’s power to appoint board members); Nina A. Mendelson, Six Simple Steps 
To Increase Contractor Accountability,  in G OVERNMENT  BY  CONTRACT,  supra note 303, at 
241, 449 n.51 (citing Irwin Mem’l, 640 F.2d at 1053).  But see Burka v . U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that FOIA applies to a division of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health). 
  307  See 29 C.F.R. § 102.66 (2009); Cooking Good Div. of Perdue Farms, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 345, 
348 (1997) (setting out evidentiary standard). 
  308  The requirement that a union obtain the votes of 50% of the actual bargaining unit — ra-
ther than 50% of those employees who vote — means that any eligible employee who does not 
vote is effectively a vote against unionization.  This requirement will prevent unions from benefit-
ing from limiting their list of eligible voters to those employees they believe support unionization. 
  309  See, e.g., JOHN C. FORTIER, ABSENTEE AND EARLY VOTING 38–39 (2006).    
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ditional polling place.310  These two forms of early voting now account 
for more than one-fourth and possibly as many as one-third of all 
votes cast nationally in political elections.311  And, during the 2008 
election, the proportion of early voters was much higher in a number 
of states: 58% of the total votes in both Nevada and Tennessee were 
cast through early in-person voting,312 while 100% of Oregon voters 
voted by mail in 2008, as did 64% of voters in Colorado and 43% of 
voters in California.313 
Early in-person voting offers precisely the same guarantees of 
secrecy as does traditional secret-ballot voting on election day.  The 
decisional technology is exactly the same, as is the official oversight of 
the process.  Only the timing has changed.  Because mail ballots are 
completed offsite — generally in the home of the voter — states have 
taken a number of steps to ensure secrecy and prevent fraud.  These 
measures, which I discuss immediately below, range from printed in-
structions and warnings on ballot forms to outright prohibitions on 
anyone other than the voter being present when ballots are completed. 
Early voting suggests a second asymmetry-correcting decisional 
mechanism, and again, adapting these voting procedures for union or-
ganizing would be relatively straightforward.  As under the previous 
proposal, unions would be required to submit to the NLRB or a neu-
tral private agency certified for these purposes the names of presump-
tively eligible voters.  In the in-person variant of the proposal, once the 
union reached a certain threshold of support, the agency would estab-
lish a polling place within reasonable proximity to the bargaining-unit 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  310  All fifty states and the District of Columbia allow mail voting, and forty-six states allow 
early in-person voting.  Mail voting can be either “excuse” or “no excuse.”  The Early Voting In-
formation Center at Reed College, Absentee and Early Voting Laws, http://earlyvoting.net/states/ 
abslaws.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).  Twenty-eight states now allow no-excuse absentee vot-
ing by mail, while twenty-two states and the District of Columbia allow voting by mail when the 
voter has a legitimate excuse for not voting in person on election day.  Id. 
  311  Twenty-five percent of voters voted before election day in 2006.  See Paul Gronke et al., 
Convenience Voting, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 437, 440 (2008).  Although no rigorous study is yet 
available, Gronke estimates that 30–33% of voters voted prior to election day in 2008.  See Stan 
Greenberg et al., Democracy Corps, The 2008 Early Vote 2 (2009), http://www.democracycorps. 
com/wp-content/files/databaseearlyvotefinal.pdf (citing All Things Considered: Early Voting 
Grows in Popularity (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 7,  2008),  available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=96756705&ft=1&f=1003).  In the 2008 election, at least 10% of 
voters nationally voted through an early in-person process.  See United States Elections Project, 
(Nearly) Final 2008 Early Voting Statistics, http://elections.gmu.edu/Early_Voting_2008_Final. 
html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).  The tally is not entirely complete.  For example, Connecticut, 
Illinois, Michigan, Texas, and Utah have submitted incomplete reports; early voting figures for 
Missouri and Pennsylvania are based on estimates; and Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Wiscon-
sin have not reported early votes yet.  Id. 
  312  United States Elections Project, supra note 311.  Similarly, 55% of the votes in North Caro-
lina, 44% in Georgia, 42% in New Mexico, and 41% in Texas were cast through early in-person 
voting.  See id. 
  313  See id.    
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members.314  The polling place would remain open during the organiz-
ing phase of the unionization campaign, and employees could, if they 
so desired, go to the polling place and cast a ballot in favor of or in 
opposition to unionization.  The agency would not inform the employ-
er of the existence of the campaign or of the opening of the polling 
place.315 
Polling place regulations — including restrictions on electioneering 
at or near the polling place — could be borrowed from current Board 
rules.  The NLRB has declared that it is “especially zealous in prevent-
ing intrusions upon the actual conduct of its elections,”316 and prohi-
bits campaigning in and around polling places.317  The Board also 
prohibits comments by either union or management representatives di-
rected toward employees who are in the polling area or in line to 
vote.318  In addition to prohibiting electioneering near polling places, 
the Board bars both union and managerial representatives from keep-
ing a list of employees who have voted — or even from taking actions 
that may lead employees to believe that their names are being recorded 
— in order to ensure the secrecy of the votes cast.319  Because the vot-
ing would be in person, the agency would not need to issue VINs, but 
would instead be charged with validating the identity of the employees 
who came to cast ballots to ensure that the person voting was in fact 
on the list of eligible voters submitted by the union.320 
In the mail voting variant, the agency would be required to print 
ballots upon a threshold showing by the union.  The ballots either 
would be sent directly to the workers identified by the union or would 
be made available to the union to distribute to workers in the prospec-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  314  In many cases, the regional office of the Board would suffice; in other cases, where the or-
ganizing campaign is more remote, an alternative location might be needed.  If practical in   
the particular circumstances, a local department of motor vehicles or other public facility might  
function. 
  315  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006); supra note 306. 
  316  Claussen Baking Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 111, 112 (1961). 
  317  See, e.g., id.; Cont’l Can Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 785 (1948).   
  318  See NLRB v. Carroll Contracting & Ready-Mix, Inc., 636 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1981); Milchem, 
Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968).  Although innocuous comments are oftentimes not sufficient to set 
aside the results of an election, the Board has held that “sustained conversation [between a union 
representative and] prospective voters waiting to cast their ballots, regardless of the content of the 
remarks exchanged, constitutes conduct which, in itself, necessitates a second election.”  Id. 
  319  See Cross Pointe Paper Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 658, 661–62 (2000); Southland Containers, Inc., 
312 N.L.R.B. 1087 (1993); Days Inn Mgmt. Co., 299 N.L.R.B. 735, 737 (1992); Cerock Wire & 
Cable Group, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1984); Masonic Homes of Cal., Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 41, 48 
(1981). 
  320  Again, procedures could be developed based on rules used in political elections.  See, e.g., 
Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 638–44 (2007).     
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tive bargaining unit.321  To prevent interference and ensure secrecy, 
union representatives would again be barred from assisting employees 
in the completion of the ballot and from being present when employees 
do so.  Election results would be invalidated if this rule were breached. 
State election law could again be instructive in designing appropri-
ate rules regarding interference and confidentiality.322  For example, 
the California Elections Code prohibits people working for a candi-
date, a candidate’s committee, or “any other group or organization at 
whose behest the individual designated to return the ballot is perform-
ing a service” from collecting completed ballots from absentee vot-
ers.323  Nevada prohibits anyone but the voter and his immediate 
family from handling a completed absentee ballot, except in limited 
situations.324  Missouri instructs absentee voters to “mark the ballot in 
secret,”325 New Mexico instructs the absentee voter to “secretly mark 
his ballot,”326 and North Carolina prohibits anyone from “be[ing] in 
the voter’s presence” when he marks an absentee ballot.327  Finally, 
some states require warnings printed somewhere on the absentee ballot 
about coercion and fraud; Colorado’s required language is typical.328 
In both in-person and mail balloting, the agency would be required 
to keep a running tally of the voting and to inform the union if and 
when support for unionization crossed the 50% threshold.  Again, once 
the union believed that it had support from a majority of the workers 
in the bargaining unit, it could demand recognition, at which point the 
employer would be entitled to challenge — before the NLRB — the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  321  In the latter case, ballots could be presented in their own sealed envelopes to be opened only 
by the voting worker.  Opening or otherwise tampering with the ballot could be grounds for set-
ting aside the election results.  For examples of similar state rules, see infra p. 726. 
  322  NMB regulations concerning mail balloting could also be helpful in this context.  See NMB 
REPRESENTATION MANUAL, supra note 289, § 14.202, at 21 (prohibiting anyone other than the 
NMB agent from “handl[ing]” a ballot). 
  323  CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3017(d) (West 2003). 
  324  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.330(4) (LexisNexis 2008). 
  325 M O. ANN. STAT. § 115.291(1) (West 2003). 
  326 N.M. STAT. § 73-14-31 (1999). 
  327  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-226.3(7) (LexisNexis 2007).  A number of states require that a 
voter completing an absentee vote “shall mark the ballot in such a manner that no other person 
will know how the ballot is marked.”  IOWA CODE § 53.15 (2007); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 168.761 ( 2004); MINN.  STAT. §  203B.03 ( 2008); S.D.  CODIFIED  LAWS §  12-19-7 ( 2004); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 24.2-707 (2006).  North Carolina explicitly allows a family member to assist an ab-
sentee voter.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-226.3.  Minnesota prohibits an individual from “solicit[ing] 
the vote of an absentee voter while in the immediate presence of the voter during the time the 
individual knows the absentee voter is voting.”  MINN. STAT. § 203B.03. 
  328  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-7.5-107(3)(b) (West 2009) (“WARNING: Any person 
who, by use of force or other means, unduly influences an eligible elector to vote in any particular 
manner or to refrain from voting, or who falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any mail 
ballot before or after it has been cast, or who destroys, defaces, mutilates, or tampers with a ballot 
is subject, upon conviction, to imprisonment, or to a fine, or both.”); see also O R. REV. STAT. 
§ 254.470(5) (2007).      
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eligibility of employees who had cast votes in the election along with 
the definition of the bargaining unit. 
4.  The Cost of Confidentiality. — Both the early voting and the 
NMB-type proposals offer a feasible way to accomplish the asymme-
try-correcting function of minimizing managerial intervention while 
avoiding the problems inherent in an open decisional mechanism.   
Confidentiality does not come for free, however, and ensuring secrecy 
in decisionmaking involves some costs.  In particular, the proposals set 
out here might make it more difficult for workers to vote in a union 
election than it would be for them to register their choices under a tra-
ditional card check regime.  In the NMB-type proposals and the mail-
in early voting proposal, workers are required either to complete a 
mail ballot or to vote via the phone or internet.  More acutely, in the 
in-person early voting proposal, workers must travel to the polling site 
to vote, a requirement that is not imposed by a traditional card check  
regime. 
Such “confidentiality costs” could imply that card check 2.0 will 
mitigate the asymmetric stickiness of the nonunion default less fully 
than a traditional card check regime.  That is, the proposals might be 
as successful as card check in eliminating the impediments to unioniza-
tion that flow from managerial intervention, but might create different 
impediments in the form of voting transaction costs.  While these costs 
are a limitation of the card check 2.0 proposals, they do not alter the 
proposals’ overall merit.  First, the actual costs of confidentiality are 
not likely to be high, and in most cases are de minimis.  Completing a 
mail-in ballot, calling a toll-free voting line, or voting via the internet 
are simple enough and similar enough to the routine tasks we complete 
on a daily basis that they are unlikely to dissuade a significant number 
of workers from voting.  The need to travel to a polling site might dis-
courage a nontrivial number of voters, although as in “get-out-the-vote 
efforts” in political elections, unions’ ability to transport voters to the 
polling place could temper this effect.  But second, and more funda-
mentally, any transaction costs imposed by card check 2.0’s voting   
mechanisms are costs that flow from the need to ensure that the sub-
stantive goal of minimizing managerial intervention is accomplished  
with a decisional mechanism that provides for confidentiality.  Be-
cause a confidential decisional mechanism is necessary to avoid jeo-
pardizing choice in the manner discussed above, the goal of advancing 
employee choice necessitates the bearing of costs associated with en-
suring confidentiality. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Maximizing employee preferences on the question of unionization, 
and the appropriateness of managerial intervention in the union-
organizing process, are issues that have long been central to federal la-   
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bor law.  This Article has offered a new way to approach these ques-
tions.  By building on contemporary theories of default rules, and de-
veloping the concept of the “asymmetry-correcting altering rule,” this 
Article has shown how a decisional mechanism like card check, or an 
alternative like rapid elections, can advance employee choice.  Mana-
gerial opposition to unionization, along with the collective action prob-
lems involved in employee efforts to unionize, make it more difficult 
for workers to unionize than it would be for employees to depart from 
a union default and choose individual employment contracting.  The 
legal regime can address these asymmetries — and thereby maximize 
employee choice — by adopting an altering rule that minimizes em-
ployer intervention in the employee organizing process. 
Of course, the union organizing process is not the only context in 
which law attempts to ensure choice — or maximize preferences — in 
the face of asymmetric power relationships and other asymmetric im-
pediments to departure.  As this discussion has shown, statutory inter-
pretation and corporate governance are two other contexts in which 
asymmetric impediments to departure exist, and there are others.  In 
each such context, we might continue to advance our understanding of 
how best to ensure choice by applying and developing the concept of 
the asymmetry-correcting altering rule presented here. 
In our context, identifying and defending the asymmetry-correcting 
function of minimizing managerial intervention has required an ex-
amination of the decisional mechanisms that are best able to achieve 
that goal.  Here, this Article has argued that while limiting managerial 
intervention serves a legitimate asymmetry-correcting function, open-
ness in decisionmaking is unrelated to this function and is not justified 
on other grounds.  This Article has therefore offered two potential al-
ternative decisional mechanisms.  Both of the suggestions preserve 
secrecy in voting while enabling employees to minimize managerial in-
tervention in the union organizing process.  Both accordingly offer a 
way to redesign the rules of employee decisionmaking consistent with 
contemporary legal theory on maximizing choice. 